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ARTICLES
Nonoriginalist Constitutional Rights and
the Problem of Judicial Finality
By DANIEL 0. CONKLE*
[No society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual
law. The earth belongs always to the living generation...
-Thomas

Jefferson'

In a nation generally committed to the principle of majoritarian gov-

ernment, the institution of judicial review stands as a stark exception, one
that permits the electorally unaccountable Supreme Court to countermand majoritarian decisions by finding them inconsistent with overriding
constitutional values. When the Court recognizes an originalistconstitutional right-a right placed beyond the reach of majorities by the constitutional framers 2 -the Court's function, though countermajoritarian, is
not especially controversial. Virtually all of the constitutional rights recognized by the modern Supreme Court, however, are nonoriginalist in
derivation; that is, they depend at least to some extent on norms not
provided by the framers, but drawn instead from some other source of

values.3
* Assistant Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington.
Professors Craig M. Bradley, Erwin Chemerinsky, Bryant G. Garth, Maurice J. Holland, Ira
C. Lupu, Earl M. Maltz, and Michael J.Perry each provided valuable comments on an earlier
version of this essay. I also received helpful input from a number of other colleagues who were
part of a summer research group. I am grateful to all these persons. Finally, I wish to thank
Maureen Straub Kordesh for her research assistance, and Indiana University and its School of
Law for the financial support that they provided for this work.
1. Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (September 6, 1789), reprinted in
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 488, 491 (A. Koch & W. Peden

ed. 1944).
2. As used in this Article, the term "framers" embraces not only the officials who voted
to propose the original Constitution and its various amendments, but also the officials who
voted in favor of ratification.
3. As Dean Terrance Sandalow has noted, "No more than a passing familiarity with
history is required to appreciate that only a very small fraction of contemporary constitutional
law corresponds with what can plausibly be considered the historical 'core meaning' of the
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No issue of constitutional theory is more fundamental than the legit-

imacy of the Supreme Court's recognition of nonoriginalist constitutional
rights.4 This issue has consumed the academic community, and the literature is awash with contributions to the ongoing debate. 5 I have participated in that scholarly conversation,6 and applaud its continuation, for
the questions of political theory addressed in the debate are of compelling
importance in our system of constitutional democracy.
Those who defend nonoriginalist judicial review have offered a variety of theoretical justifications for the practice.7 Considerably less attention, however, has been devoted to the doctrinal implications of these
various theories. Yet the same theoretical arguments that may serve to
justify nonoriginalist review may also suggest the need for important
modifications in the Supreme Court's constitutional doctrine. Thus, contrary to the suggestions of some,' the scholarly debate concerning nonConstitution, even on the most generous interpretation of that notion." Sandalow, ConstitutionalInterpretation,79 MICH. L. REV. 1033, 1061 (1981). Professor Michael J. Perry likewise
has concluded that "virtually all of [the] constitutional doctrine regarding human rights fashioned by the Supreme Court in this century" is based upon nonoriginalist review. M. PERRY,
THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INQUIRY INTO THE LEGrrIMACY OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLICYMAKING BY THE JUDICIARY 91 (1982). This is not to say,

however, that the Supreme Court readily admits the predominance of nonoriginalist review.
See generally infra note 173 and accompanying text.
4. My focus in this Article is on constitutional doctrine relating to individual rights,
doctrine typically derived from the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. I am concerned with federal, not state, constitutional law, and especially with the role of the United
States Supreme Court in the formulation of that law.
5. No fewer than four recent law review symposia relate to this subject: Constitutional
Adjudication and Democratic Theory, 56 N.Y.U. L. REV. 259 (1981); JudicialReview versus
Democracy, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1981); ConstitutionalInterpretation,58 S.CAL. L. REV. 551
(1985); Judicial Review and the Constitution-The Text and Beyond, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV.
443 (1983). Individual contributions to the debate include several recent books. See, eg., 3.
AGRESTO, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1984); P. BOBBITr,
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE (1982); J.CHOPER, JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE NATIONAL POLrrICAL PROCESS: A FUNCTIONAL RECONSIDERATION OF THE ROLE OF THE SUPREME COURT
(1980), J.ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); M.

supra note 3.
6. See Conkle, The Legitimacy of JudicialReview in Individual Rights Cases: Michael
Perry'sConstitutional Theory and Beyond, 69 MINN. L. REV. 587 (1985).
7. See, e.g., M. PERRY, supra note 3; Sandalow, supra note 3; Wellington, Common Law
Rules and ConstitutionalDouble Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221
(1973). Cf J.ELY, supra note 5 (defending a broad form of judicial review but attempting to
justify that review by reference to the framers' intentions).
8. See, e.g., Lupu, Constitutional Theory and the Searchfor the Workable Premise, 8 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 579, 580 (1983) ("Tied to a set of academic models and rubrics, detached
from the law's flow, constitutional scholarship is at risk of irrelevance to its objective concerns
and to other bodies of law and legal scholarship."); Sedler, The Legitimacy Debate in ConstitutionalAdjudication: An Assessment and a Different Perspective, 44 OHIO ST. L.J. 93, 93 (1983)
("What has intrigued me the most about the debate ...is its utterly academic nature.").
PERRY,
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originalist review is, or at least ought to be, much more than an academic
exercise, for the manner in which the debate is resolved in turn may demand significant changes in the nature of judicial review itself.9
In this Article, I shall discuss a theory of nonoriginalist judicial review and the implications of that theory for a basic and well-established
feature of judicial review-the finality of the Supreme Court's constitu-

tional rulings. The theory justifies nonoriginalist review as a practice
that furthers the moral development of our society through the constitu-

tionalization of contemporary and emerging national values, and that, in
addition, serves the independently significant function of nationalizing

our governmental policies concerning controversial individual rights.
The implications of this theory suggest that the doctrine ofjudicial finality should be abandoned for certain types of constitutional rulings.
I.

The Problem of Judicial Finality in the Adjudication of
Constitutional Rights

In the landmark case of Marbury v. Madison,1 0 the Supreme Court
first claimed for itself the power of judicial review-the power to deter9. Cf Saphire, Gay Rights and the Constitution: An Essay on Constitutional Theory,
Practice,and Dronenburg v. Zech, 10 U. DAYTON L. REV. 767, 811 (1985) ("[T]he shape and
direction of constitutional doctrine is often importantly, indeed profoundly, influenced by
one's underlying conception of the nature of the Constitution and the legitimate role and scope
of judicial review.").
Those theories demanding the most drastic changes in the practice of judicial review are
not nonoriginalist theories at all, but rather are theories suggesting that the Supreme Court's
proper function is limited to originalistconstitutional decisionmaking. See, e.g., R. BERGER,
GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT

(1977); Bork, Neutral Principlesand Some FirstAmendment Problems,47 IND. L.J. 1 (1971);
Monaghan, OurPerfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. REv. 353 (1981); Rehnquist, The Notion of
a Living Constitution, 54 TEx. L. REv. 693 (1976). These originalist theories are radical in the
sense that they would render illegitimate a substantial portion of the Supreme Court's contemporary constitutional doctrine. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
Another novel theory that might demand significant doctrinal changes is that recently
proposed by Professor Bruce A. Ackerman. Ackerman would give binding constitutional effect not only to the original Constitution and its formal amendments, but also to certain other
strong statements of public sentiment, such as those accompanying the shifts in constitutional
doctrine that occurred in the New Deal era. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering
the Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984). Ackerman suggests that his "dualist" theory "will
require nothing less than a dualist reinterpretation of every significant event in our constitutional history-from the American Revolution to Watergate, from Marbury to Roe." Id. at
1071. Unfortunately, however, Ackerman makes no effort to evaluate, in light of his theory,
any of the modem Supreme Court's expansive doctrine protecting individual rights. For a
critique of Ackerman's basic argument, see Van Alstyne, Notes on a Bicentennial Constitution:
PartI, Processesof Change, 1984 U. ILL. L. REV. 933, 951 n.51. See also Levinson, What Do
Lawyers Know (And What Do They Do With Their Knowledge)? Comments on Schauer and
Moore, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 441, 451 n.45 (1985).
10. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
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mine the meaning of the Constitution1 1 when governmental actions are
challenged on constitutional grounds. Although Marbury itself arguably
left open a number of questions concerning the effect of the Supreme
Court's constitutional opinions,12 the modern Court takes an exceedingly
broad view of its interpretive role. Thus, the Court does not view its
interpretations of the Constitution as binding only in the particular cases
in which they are announced, nor does it expect executive or legislative
officials to reevaluate for themselves the validity of the Court's constitutional rulings. Instead, the Court considers its interpretations to be final
and determinative statements of general law, reversible only by constitutional amendment or by the Court's own subsequent change of opinion. 3
The Supreme Court essentially equates its rulings with the Constitution
itself, and the Court's opinions thus represent the "supreme Law of the
Land." 14
This is not to suggest that the political branches should or do refrain
from considering questions of constitutional interpretation. They may
evaluate constitutional issues not yet decided by the Court,15 and they
11. The proper meaning of "the Constitution," of course, depends on a theory of what
"the Constitution" means. See generally infra Parts I.A. & I.B. (discussing originalist and
nonoriginalist constitutional decisionmaking).
12. For a general discussion and analysis ofMarbury, see Van Alstyne, A CriticalGuideto
Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1.
13. For a discussion of the tension between the doctrine of Supreme Court finality and the
notion that the Justices are constrained to follow certain rules or standards in the decision of
constitutional cases, see Valauri, Constitutional Theodicy: The Antimony of FinalityandFallibility in Judicial Review, 29 ST. Louis U. L.J. 245 (1985).
14. Perhaps the most explicit Supreme Court statement of this position appears in Cooper
v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1958):
[W]e should answer the premise of the actions of the Governor and Legislature that
they are not bound by our holding in [Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483
(1954)]. It is necessary only to recall some basic constitutional propositions which
are settled doctrine.
Article VI of the Constitution makes the Constitution the "Supreme Law of the
Land." In 1803, Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for a unanimous Court, referring
to the Constitution as "the fundamental and paramount law of the nation," declared
in the notable case of Marbury v. Madison [5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 177] that "It is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law
is." This decision declared the basic principle that the federal judiciary is supreme in
the exposition of the law of the Constitution, and that principle has ever since been
respected by this Court and the Country as a permanent and indispensable feature of
our constitutional system. It follows that the interpretation of the Fourteenth
Amendment enunciated by this Court in the Brown Case is the supreme law of the
land, and Art. VI of the Constitution makes it of binding effect ....
15. Mayor Donald Fraser of Minneapolis, for example, recently vetoed a controversial
ordinance regulating pornography based on his belief that it violated the First Amendment.
See Bryden, Between Two Constitutions: Feminism andPornography,2 CONsT. COMMENTARY
147, 149, 172-73 (1985). For conflicting views concerning the propriety of the mayor's constitutionally based veto, compare Letter from Lawrence Tribe to Alice Rainville, President of the
Minneapolis City Council (Jan. 8, 1984) (arguing that the mayor "usurped the judicial func-
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may express their disagreement with decisions that the Court has
reached. 6 But the opinions of elected officials on issues yet to be adjudicated are not binding on the Court, 7 and any disagreement with the
Court on decided questions has no legal effect. 8
This doctrine ofjudicial finality, which gives the Supreme Court the
final, authoritative word on questions of constitutional interpretation,
raises important issues of political theory. Indeed, the existence of this
doctrine, and the polity's acquiescence to it, ' 9 seem quite out of character

for a society that generally governs itself through elected representatives.
The Supreme Court, an unelected body of life-tenured judges, is permit-

ted not only to decide the meaning of constitutional rights, but to make
these decisions final and conclusive on the political branches of govern-

ment.20 Thus, through the recognition of constitutional rights, the
tion"), reprintedin Bryden, supra, at 180 with Levinson, supra note 9, at 453-54 & n.52 (characterizing Tribe's position as "remarkable").
16. See generally G. GUNTHER, CONSTrruTIONAL LAW 21-29 (1lth ed. 1985) (discussing the authoritativeness of the Supreme Court's constitutional interpretations and the role of
legislative and executive officials in considering constitutional questions).
17. In some few cases, the Supreme Court does construe the Constitution to leave certain
constitutional questions to the popular branches. See J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG,

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 109-20 (2d ed. 1983) (discussing the "political question" doctrine).
18. It is not entirely true that majoritarian officials are powerless to implement their own
constitutional opinions on questions already decided differently by the Supreme Court. In
particular, although they cannot implement a broader view of their constitutional power than
that recognized by the Court, they can take a more restricted view, and, based on their own
conceptions of the Constitution, refrain from taking actions that the Court has previously
upheld as valid. Thus, for example, President Andrew Jackson vetoed a bill to recharter the
Bank of the United States because he thought it unconstitutional, even though McCulloch v.
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), had already upheld the constitutionality of the bank.
See G.GUNTHER, supra note 16, at 22-23. Likewise, in the context of individual rights, legislative and executive officials may envision a larger field of constitutionally protected individual
liberty than that recognized by the Court, and may refuse-for constitutional reasons-to take
action that the Court has upheld as constitutionally permissible. To this extent, then,
majoritarian disagreement with the Court may have direct legal consequences, albeit consequences resulting not from affirmative governmental action, but rather from the government's
refusal.to act. Cf Brest, The ConscientiousLegislator'sGuide to ConstitutionalInterpretation,
27 STAN. L. REV. 585 (1975) (arguing that legislators should consider the constitutionality of
proposed legislation and refrain from unconstitutional enactments).
19. As Professor Paul Brest has observed, "The belief in judicial exclusivity is so widespread that it is usually assumed rather than argued for. Most citizens, politicians, and scholars seem to agree with or acquiesce in the Supreme Court's claim to be the ultimate interpreter
of the Constitution." Brest, Who Decides?, 58 S.CAL. L. REv. 661, 670 (1985).
20. John Agresto has drawn an important distinction:
It should be emphasized that the doctrine of judicial finality is conceptually quite
distinct from the doctrine of judicial review, although our immediate reaction is to
equate them. The doctrine of finality concerns the question of whether the opinions
of the judiciary (or of any branch) are finally and authoritatively determinative of
constitutionality. The power of judicial review may... or may not ...imply that
such judicial decisions are authoritative, final, and binding on all branches.
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Supreme Court may defeat majoritarian policies, giving effect instead to
the Court's own judgment concerning the meaning of the Constitution.
And, absent the extraordinary step of constitutional amendment, 2 ' the
polity is legally powerless to reverse the Court's decisions.2 2
A.

Originalist Judicial Review

Although the doctrine of judicial finality may thus seem out of place
in our governmental system, it is not especially troubling in the context
of originalist constitutional decisionmaking for three related reasons.
First, in the exercise of originalist judicial review, the Supreme Court
undertakes an exclusively historical inquiry, attempting to ascertain precisely what constitutional rights the framers of the Constitution intended

to protect.23 Being historical in derivation, this group of rights is conAgresto, The Limits of Judicial Supremacy: A Proposalfor "Checked Activism", 14 GA. L.
REV. 471,473 n.15 (1980). Although Canada's new constitution, for example, authorizes judicial review, it generally permits Parliament and the provincial legislatures to override judicially
protected constitutional rights. See CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS §§ 24(1), 33.
21. A constitutional amendment, of course, changes the language of the Constitution.
Accordingly, even if the opponents of an unpopular Supreme Court decision were able to effect
the passage of an amendment to "reverse" that decision, the amendment would not directly
repudiate the soundness of the Court's constitutional ruling. To be sure, the Constitution
would have a different meaning after the adoption of the amendment, but only because its text
had been revised. The Court's reading of the Constitution's prior language, although now of
historic interest only, would remain authoritative.
22. The majoritarian branches of the federal government do possess certain legal powers
that might be utilized in attempts to influence the Court's constitutional decisions, including
the powers to appoint and to impeach justices and to control the Court's budget and jurisdiction. However powerful these devices might be for other purposes, however, none of them
provides an effective means for countermanding a specific Supreme Court decision, at least not
without also having much broader ramifications for the Court and its governmental role. See
J. CHOPER, supra note 5, at 49-52 (noting that the appointment, impeachment, and budgetary
powers of the political branches are ineffective in controlling the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking); J. ELY, supra note 5, at 46-47 (same); Conkle, supra note 6, at 653-60
(arguing that Congress has a broad power to adopt legislation controlling the Supreme Court's
appellate jurisdiction, but that the enactment of any such legislation would have dramatic
consequences for the Court's role in American government).
23. The Court encounters numerous difficulties in its quest for the framers' intentions.
See Saphire, JudicialReview in the Name of the Constitution, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 745, 77278 (1983). Indeed, a number of scholars have suggested that an exclusively historical inquiry is
not possible, and that originalism therefore is not a practical alternative. See, e.g., Bennett,
The Mission of MoralReasoning in ConstitutionalLaw,58 S. CAL. L. REn'. 647, 648-55 (1985);
Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,60 B.U.L. REV. 204, 221-22
(1980); Chevigny, Why the Continental Disputes Are Important: A Comment on Hoy and
Garet, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 206 (1985); Dworkin, The Forum of Principle, 56 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 469, 471-500 (1981); Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique ofInterpretivism and NeutralPrinciples, 96 HARV. L. REV. 781, 793-804 (1983). Other scholars contend,
to the contrary, that originalism is a real option for judges. See, e.g., Monaghan, supra note 9,
at 377; Perry, The Authority of Text, Tradition,and Reason: A Theory of Constitutional "Interpretation," 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 551, 597-602 (1985) (appendix to article). In any event,
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stant and unchanging.2' Thus, once an issue of originalist constitutional
interpretation has been correctly decided, it has been correctly decided
for all time.25 Second, calling as it does for the analysis of written materials and the determination of legal intentions, the Court's originalist
function closely approximates traditional statutory interpretation.2 6
Thus originalist review requires the Court to analyze the text of an enactment and its legislative history, and, with the aid of judicially developed
rules for determining legal intentions, to decide what the relevant provision was intended to mean by the officials responsible for its adoption.27
Judges, especially at the appellate level, are trained and experienced in
this type of decisionmaking process. As a result, the highest appellate
court in the United States is well suited for the task of originalist review;
if any institution of American government is capable of determining the
originalism as a theory of constitutional adjudication demands that the Court search for the
framers' intentions and nothing more. See infra note 40.
24. There is no persuasive evidence that the framers "intended the judiciary to develop
new individual rights, which correspondingly create new disabilities for democratic government." See Bork, The Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 695, 697. On the other hand, originalism does not necessarily preclude an application
of the framers' intentions to circumstances they could not have foreseen. See Conkle, supra
note 6, at 599 n.43 (discussing the possibility of originalist invalidation of modem analogues of
practices the framers intended to proscribe). See generally Simon, The Authority of the Constitution and Its Meaning: A Preface to a Theory of ConstitutionalInterpretation,58 S. CAL. L.
REv. 603, 608 (1985) (noting that originalism rests on a belief "that the provisions of the
Constitution should mean throughout history whatever they meant in the 'original
understanding' ").

25. Cf. Wallace v. Jafree, 105 S. Ct. 2479, 2520 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) ("As
drafters of our Bill of Rights, the Framers inscribed the principles that control today. Any
deviation from their intentions frustrates the permanence of that Charter ... ").
26. The proper judicial role in statutory interpretation is itself an extremely complex and
controversial matter. See, e.g., W. Popkin, The Collaborative Model of Statutory Interpretation (1984) (urging a model of statutory interpretation that would engage courts in a process of
dialogue with the legislature) (unpublished manuscript). By referring to "traditionalstatutory
interpretation," I mean to describe a judicial function in which a court seeks to discover what a
statutory enactment was intended to mean by the legislature responsible for its adoption. I do
not mean to suggest that this view of statutory interpretation is either normatively appealing or
descriptively accurate in all cases.
27. Professor H. Jefferson Powell has conducted important historical research suggesting
the modem rules for determining legal intentions-including especially those that support a
focus on the proceedings and individual intentions of those who assembled in Philadelphiamay depart from the rules that the framers themselves might have anticipated when they proposed and ratified the original Constitution. See Powell, The Original Understandingof Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885 (1985). Powell also concludes, however, that
"intentionalism in the modem sense" prevailed by the time of the Civil War, see id. at 947, and
therefore in time to guide the drafters and ratifiers of what has become the constitutional
limitation on governmental power most frequently invoked by the Supreme Court-the Fourteenth Amendment. See generally infra text accompanying notes 160-162.
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original meaning of the Constitution, surely it is the Supreme Court.2 8
A third reason for giving the Court the final word in defining
originalist constitutional rights is to ensure an honest and disinterested
determination of the framers' intentions. The recognition of constitutional rights serves to constrain majoritarian policymaking and to limit
the power of elected officials. If these constraints are to be effective, the
task of enforcement must be entrusted to officials who are detached from
majoritarian pressures and have no direct stake in the outcome. The
majoritarian branches simply cannot be left with the task of deciding for
themselves what limits the framers imposed on their exercise of power;
that task better falls on the Supreme Court, a body with the political
independence necessary for performing a distinctly countermajoritarian
function.
The countermajoritarian nature of originalist judicial review cannot
be doubted, for the recognition of originalist constitutional rights works
to frustrate majoritarian policymaking.2 9 The extent of this intrusion on
majoritarian government, however, should not be overstated. The
Supreme Court is authorized to recognize only a limited set of unchanging constitutional rights, and the determination of those rights would appear to lie squarely within the Court's institutional competence.
In Marbury v. Madison, Chief Justice Marshall declared that "[ilt is
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department" to determine the meaning of the Constitution," ° and that the Constitution is "a
superior paramount law, unchangeable by ordinary means.... [not] alterable when the legislature shall please to alter it."3 1 If Marshall thus
recognized a doctrine of judicial finality, however, he did so in light of an
originalist conception of the Constitution, at least as to constitutional
limitationson governmental action.32 As examples of protected constitu28. Mine is a claim of comparative institutionalcompetence, comparing the competence
of the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in particular to the competence of the legislative and executive branches. I make no claim, for example, that the Supreme Court is more
competent in this task than accomplished legal historians. For a sophisticated and carefully
reasoned argument favoring a comparative institutional approach to constitutional law, see
Komesar, Taking InstitutionsSeriously: Introduction to a Strategyfor ConstitutionalAnalysis,
51 U. CHI. L. REV. 366 (1984).

29. See Chemerinsky, The Price of Asking the Wrong Question: An Essay on ConstitutionalScholarship and JudicialReview, 62 TEX. L. REv. 1207, 1209 (1984) (noting that "any
judicial decision that overturns a policy enacted by a popularly elected legislature is antimajoritarian") (emphasis in original).
30. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
31. Id.
32. Chief Justice Marshall later gave a broad interpretation to the power-grantingprovisions of the Constitution, which he construed to permit the elected national government to
respond flexibly to changing times and conditions. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
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tional rights, Marshall cited the prohibition on bills of attainder and ex
post facto laws, as well as the evidentiary requirements for proving
treason:
The constitution declares that 'no bill of attainder or ex post
facto law shall be passed.'
If, however, such a bill should be passed, and a person should
be prosecuted under it; must the court condemn to death those
victims whom the constitution endeavors to preserve?
'No person,' says the constitution, 'shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses to the same overt act,
or on confession in open court.'
...If the legislature should change that rule, and declare one
witness, or a confession out of court, sufficient for conviction,
must
33
the constitutional principle yield to the legislative act?
Marshall recognized a judicial right and duty only to identify and protect
constitutional principles that were "designed to be permanent." 34 Indeed, given his examples, Marshall might well have been limiting the
judicial protection of constitutional rights to cases in which majoritarian
officials had clearly and obviously violated the intended meaning of a
constitutional provision.35
Needless to say, originalist interpretation is not always so easy.3 6 To
interpret the vaguely worded Fourteenth Amendment,37 for example, the
Court must look beneath the text to the historical reasons for its adoption. Through its analysis, the Court might conclude, for example, that
the framers of the amendment intended to protect certain civil rights for
the newly freed slaves and to ensure the constitutional validity of the
Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819) ("[W]e must never forget, that it is a constitution we are expounding.") (emphasis in original). See also Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
To say that the power of majoritarian officials should be construed broadly, of course, hardly
supports a "broad" reading of the power-limiting provisions of the Constitution, for such a
reading works to frustrate, not facilitate, the operation of majoritarian government. See M.
Perry, supra note 3, at 33-35.
In cases following Marbury, Marshall also made decisions suggesting that his respect for
majoritarian policymaking differed with the level of government responsible for the policy
under attack. Thus, state laws were treated less deferentially than federal ones. See Van Alstyne, InterpretingThis Constitution: The Unhelpful ContributionsofSpecial Theories of Judicial Review, 35 U. FLA. L. REv. 209, 213 (1983).
33. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 179.
34. Id. at 176.
35. Cf. Grey, The Constitution as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1, 14-15 (1984) (noting
Marshall's emphasis on the written constitutional limitations on governmental power).
36. See supra note 23.
37. "No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
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Civil Rights Act of 1866.38 Although based on a much more tenuous
historical record, the Court might also conclude that the Fourteenth
Amendment was intended to make the Bill of Rights apply to state as

well as federal action.39 Regardless of the difficulty of its inquiry or the
accuracy of its conclusion, however, the Court's basic function in
originalist judicial review is always to determine the intentions of the
constitutional framers and to ensure that those intentions are protected
"permanently" against majoritarian transgression.'
38. See R. BERGER, supra note 9.
39. Justice Black's prominent defense of this historical position appears in his dissenting
opinion in Adamson v. California, 332 U.S. 46, 68-123 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting). Black
found that
[the historical record] conclusively demonstrates that the language of the first section
of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken as a whole, was thought by those responsible
for its submission to the people, and by those who opposed its submission, sufficiently
explicit to guarantee that thereafter no state could deprive its citizens of the privileges and protections of the Bill of Rights.
Id. at 74-75. Contrary to Black's position, the prevailing approach on the Supreme Court uses
the Fourteenth Amendment as authority only for selectively applying certain provisions of the
Bill of Rights to the states. See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). Academic
inquiries, however, have found little historical support either for Black's "'total incorporation"
position or for the "selective incorporation" doctrine embraced by the Court. See, e.g., L.
Levy, The FourteenthAmendment and the Bill of Rights, in JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTrTUTIONAL HISTORY 64 (1972); Fairman, Does the FourteenthAmendment Incor-

porate the Bill of Rights? The Original Understanding,2 STAN. L REv. 5 (1949). See also
Bond, The Original Understandingof the FourteenthAmendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania, 18 AKRON L. Rv. 435, 464-65 (1985) (concluding that those who ratified the Fourteenth Amendment in Illinois, Ohio, and Pennsylvania plainly did not intend for the
amendment to incorporate the Bill of Rights). But cf. Farber & Muench, The Ideological
Origins of the Fourteenth Amendment, 1 CONST. COMMENTARY 235, 269-75 (1984) (suggesting that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to perfect the protection of
fundamental rights already existing in natural law and probably intended to make the Bill of
Rights applicable to state action); Maltz, The Fourteenth Amendment as Political Compromise-Section One in the Joint Committee on Reconstruction, 45 OHIO ST. L.J. 933 (1984)
(arguing that the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended to make the Bill of Rights
and certain other "civil rights" assertable against state action, but that they intended to exclude voting and other "political rights" from the scope of the amendment).
40. Originalist constitutional rights are not limited to rights expressly ordained by the
constitutional text or its legislative history. They also include implied rights that fairly may be
inferred from the historical circumstances surrounding the constitutional enactment or from
the type of governmental structures the framers created. See Grey, Do We Have an Unwritten
Constitution?, 27 STAN. L. REv. 703, 706 n.9 (1975). For example, a constitutional right to
travel or migrate interstate free from undue governmental interference might be inferred from
the framers' creation of a national polity. As Chief Justice Taney obser%ed in the Passenger
Cases:
For all the great purposes for which the Federal government was formed, we are one
people, with one common country. We are all citizens of the United States; and, as
members of the same community, must have the right to pass and repass through
every part of it without interruption, as freely as in our own States.
48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 492 (1849) (Taney, C.J., dissenting). Cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 630 (1969) ("We have no occasion to ascribe the source of this right to travel interstate to
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In the exercise of originalist judicial review, then, the Supreme
Court seeks to discover an unchanging set of constitutional values; it is
more competent than alternative governmental decisionmakers in the
discovery of those values; and it is performing a necessary function in our
constitutional democracy, but one that requires only a limited retreat
from our fundamental commitment to majoritarian policymaking. These
three factors combine to support the doctrine of judicial finality in the
determination of originalist constitutional rights.
Originalist constitutional rights, however, represent no more than a
tiny fraction of the constitutional rights recognized by the modern
Supreme Court.' Thus, to conclude that the doctrine of judicial finality
is defensible for originalist constitutional decisionmaking is significant
only to the very limited extent that the Court engages in that type of
judicial review. Far more important, and far more troubling, is the doctrine of judicial finality as applied to the Supreme Court's recognition of
nonoriginalistconstitutional rights.
B.

Nonoriginalist Judicial Review

Nonoriginalist judicial review is a process that bears only faint resemblance to originalist review. 2 Originalist review engages the Court
in a historical search for a closed set of unchanging values, those placed
in the Constitution at the time of its adoption. Nonoriginalist review, on
the other hand, does not depend on the fixed intentions of the framers.
Rather than looking to the beliefs of those historical actors, the Court
attempts to identify and give effect to important values linked in some
other way with the American tradition.
There is no general agreement on the specific source or sources from
which nonoriginalist values properly may be drawn. Nonetheless, most
scholars at least agree that the search must be for values tied to our
American political culture, including our contemporary political culture.
Professor Ira C. Lupu, for example, has argued that constitutional rights
properly may be recognized on the basis of values that have strong supa particular constitutional provision."). See generally C.
(1969).

BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELA-

TIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

Nevertheless, the originalist search is always for the framers' intentions, regardless of how
those intentions might be derived. And when the framers' intentions have been exhausted, so
too has the Court's originalist function, for the Court cannot recognize an originalist constitutional right based on considerations drawn from any other source. For an elaboration of the
nature and limitations of originalist judicial review, see Conkle, supra note 6, at 591-601.
41. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
42. See Brest, supra note 23, at 234 ("It is rather like having a remote ancestor who came
over on the Mayflower.").
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port not only in American history, but also in our present-day society.4 3
Dean Harry H. Wellington has defended the constitutionalization of
what he calls America's "contemporary morality,"' and Professor
Michael J. Perry has expressed a similar opinion.4" Numerous other
scholars, in one way or another, also have recognized that nonoriginalist
review must look to the present as much as the past.4 6
For purposes of evaluating the doctrine of judicial finality, nonoriginalist review differs markedly from originalist constitutional decisionmaking. By its very nature, nonoriginalist review depends on a set of
societal values that has changed and continues to change over the course
of our nation's history. As a result, the content of nonoriginalist constitutional rights is not fixed; it inevitably changes over time. Likewise, the
process of identifying nonoriginalist rights does not depend on a determination of legal intentions embodied in historical documents. Instead, it
rests on an evaluation of our American society and the values to which it
clings. If the Constitution of our time protects a woman's right to abortion,4 7 for example, it is not because the framers so provided, but rather
because today's American culture in some way values that protection. If
the Equal Protection Clause now calls for special judicial scrutiny of
43. See Lupu, Untangling the Strands of the Fourteenth Amendment, 77 MICH. L. REv.
981, 1040-41 (1979). For a similar argument, see Developments in the Law-The Constitution
and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1156, 1177-87 (1980).
Professor Lupu might reject a characterization of his position as "nonoriginalist." Cf.
Lupu, supra note 8, at 601-09 (criticizing the "interpretive"/"noninterpretive" dichotomy).
44. See Wellington, supra note 7. See also Wellington, The Nature of JudicialReview, 91
YALE L.J. 486 (1982).
45. See Perry, Abortion, the Public Morals,and the Police Power: The Ethical Functionof
Substantive Due Process, 23 UCLA L. REv. 689 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Perry, Ethical
Function]; Perry, The Abortion Funding Cases: A Comment on the Supreme Court's Role in
American Government, 66 GEO. Li. 1191 (1978). For Professor Perry's most recent thoughts
concerning nonoriginalist judicial review and the proper source or sources of nonoriginalist
constitutional values, see M. PERRY, supra note 3; Perry, supra note 23.
46. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT

THE BAR OF POLrrIcs 236 (1962) (arguing that the Justices should "extract 'fundamental
presuppositions' from their deepest selves, but in fact from the evolving morality of our tradition"); C. BLACK, DECISION ACCORDING TO LAW 39-42 (1981) (discussing constitutional adjudication based on "national ethical consensus"); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 TermForward: The Forms ofJustice, 93 HARV.L. REV. 1, 9 (1979) ("The task of the judge is to give
meaning to constitutional values, and he does that by working with the constitutional text,
history, and social ideals."); Grey, supra note 40, at 706 (discussing the courts' "role as the
expounder of basic national ideals of individual liberty and fair treatment, even when the content of these ideals is not expressed as a matter of positive law in the written Constitution," but
rather derives from "contemporary moral and political ideals"); Sandalow, supra note 3, at
1050 ("The entirety of [our] history, together with current aspirations that are both shaped by
it and shape the meaning derived from it, far more than the intentions of the framers, determine what each generation finds in the Constitution.").
47. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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classifications based on gender,48 alienage,4 9 illegitimacy, m and perhaps
mental retardation, 5 1 as well as race,52 that is because societal values
have pushed the clause "beyond its original 1868 concept" to "a point
where.., it embraces a 'broader principle.' "I At least on first consideration, however, the determination of these modem American values
would seem a task for which the Supreme Court has no special competence or expertise. Indeed, to the contrary, the task would seem uniquely
within the province of our popularly elected institutions, which are connected much more closely to the American people and their values.5 4
The first two factors supporting the doctrine of judicial finality in the
exercise of originalistjudicial review thus are notably absent when the
Court engages in nonoriginalistreview: there are no fixed and unchangeable answers to be discovered, 55 and there is no apparent reason to prefer
the judgment of the Supreme Court on these questions to the answers
provided by other American institutions.
The third factor supporting the doctrine of judicial finality for
originalist constitutional decisionmaking is closely related to the first
two. Through the exercise of originalist review, the Supreme Court provides a disinterested forum for policing the framers' limitations on
majoritarian government. This type of judicial review, including the doctrine of judicial finality that it embraces, is defensible not only because it
serves this critical purpose, but also because the Court is limited to the

identification of a fixed set of constitutional rights that it is well qualified
48. See, ag., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976); Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677
(1973).
49. See, eg., Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971).
50. See, eg., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91 (1982).
51. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3260 (1985) (purporting to reject any special judicial scrutiny of classifications based on mental retardation, but
invalidating such a classification on the ground that it "appear[ed] ...to rest on an irrational
prejudice against the mentally retarded"). See also id. at 3263-65 (Marshall, J., concurring in
the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (arguing that despite the Court's disclaimer, its
opinion and holding in fact reflect a heightened standard of equal protection review).
52. See, e.g., Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
53. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 404, 404-05 (1978) (Blackmun, J.
(separate opinion) (quoting McDonald v. Santa Fe Transp. Co., 427 U.S. 273, 296 (1976)). See
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3268 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (noting that "constitutional principles
of equality ...

evolve over time").

54. I will argue below that despite this seeming lack of competence, the Court in fact is
capable of performing an important role in the identification and protection of modem national values. See infra Part II. See generallyFiss, supra note 46, at 12-17 (arguing that judges
have the capacity to make a special contribution in the identification of "public values" due to
the definition and structure of the judicial office).
55. One could argue that the answers change with the passage of time because the questions change, e.g., "What does the Equal Protection Clause mean now?"
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to ascertain. Thus, not only does originalist review serve an important
function; it does so with only a minimal intrusion on the principle of
majoritarian consent.
Nonoriginalistreview, by contrast, does not confine the Court to a
limited set of constitutional rights. Rather, it permits the Court to undertake a potentially open-ended search for important American values,
an endeavor that would not seem to fall within its judicial expertise.
Given the remarkably broad potential scope of nonoriginalist review and
the Supreme Court's apparent lack of special competence in its exercise,
the performance of such review by an unelected judiciary cuts at the
heart of majoritarian government. If the quite limited intrusion on majoritarianism effected by originalist review is justified by the need for an
independent consideration of the framers' intentions, what justifies the
much more massive assault on majoritarian decisionmaking reflected in
the practice of nonoriginalist review?
Judicial lawmaking, of course, extends beyond the constitutional
arena. In the construction of ambiguous statutes and in the articulation
of common law rules, the Supreme Court and other courts develop rules
of law independent of any direct sanction by elected officials. Such nonconstitutional decisionmaking may include a judicial determination of
societal values and how those values should be implemented in legal doctrine,5 6 thereby raising questions of judicial competence similar to those
presented by nonoriginalist constitutional rulings. Although the appropriate parameters of nonconstitutional judicial lawmaking are open to
serious debate, such lawmaking is never beyond the reach of majoritarian
control, because ordinary legislative action can overturn nonconstitutional doctrine. A legislature can amend or enact a statute to replace a
court-made interpretation or common law ruling with which it disagrees.
The judicial and legislative dialogue on nonconstitutional legal issues
may well reflect a healthy and productive lawmaking partnership, 57 but
the popularly elected legislature retains the final word on questions of
nonconstitutional law.
This is not so in the determination of constitutional rights, even
when those rights are nonoriginalist in derivation. In this province, it is
the Court that concludes the debate. Its decisions can supplant the legislative judgments under attack and replace them with judicial judgments
that are themselves immune from subsequent legislative action.5 8 Thus,
56. See, e.g., Wellington, supra note 7, at 235-54.
57. See, e.g., W. Popkin, supra note 26.
58. The Court thus "concludes the debate" in the sense that its constitutional rulings
constitute final and determinative statements of law, reversible only by constitutional amend-
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the problem raised by nonoriginalist judicial review is not simply the legitimacy of judicial lawmaking based on societal values.59 Rather, it is
the finality of the Court's nonoriginalist constitutional decisions that
makes the problem of legitimacy especially acute.60 Why should the
Court, and not the popular branches, have the final say in determining
which societal values warrant constitutional protection?6 1 Why should
the Court, in making this type of constitutional decision, be the "ultimate
interpreter of the Constitution,'" "supreme in the exposition of [its]
law"?6 3

II. The Functions and Functional Operation of Nonoriginalist
Judicial Review
A defense of nonoriginalist judicial review in the adjudication of
constitutional rights requires the formulation of a normative theory."
To be taken seriously, the theory must recognize the basic principle of

majoritarian consent and the countermajoritarian nature of nonoriginalist review." Moreover, because nonoriginalist review may take
more than one form,66 the theorist must describe the particular sort of

ment or by the Court's own change of opinion. See supra text accompanying note 13. In a
more general sense, of course, the debate can continue, and it might even lead to a constitutional amendment or to a change in the Supreme Court's doctrine. See generally supra note 16
and accompanying text; infra notes 144-149 and accompanying text.
59. As Professor Thomas W. Merrill has noted, "the fact that constitutional lawmakingincluding nonoriginalist judicial review-is immune from congressional override may justify us
in regarding it as an especially troubling form of judicial lawmaking, but this fact does not
support the claim that it is a different type of judicial lawmaking altogether." Merrill, The
Common Law Powers of FederalCourts, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 6 (1985).
60. Cf.J.AGRESTO, supra note 5, at 102-07 (criticizing the doctrine ofjudicial finality on
constitutional questions as highly problematic in a constitutional system of checks and balances); Wellington, The Nature ofJudicialReview, supra note 44,at 487 ("It is... the issue of
finality, more than other questions posed by majoritarian theory, that proponents of judicial
review must address.").
61. As Professor Alexander M. Bickel concluded, "nothing ... can alter the essential
reality that judicial review is a deviant institution in the American democracy." A. BICKEL,
supra note 46, at 18. This deviance, I have argued, arises in large part from the doctrine of
judicial finality as applied to the recognition of nonoriginalist constitutional rights.
62. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962).
63. Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958).
64. Needless to say, such a normative theory cannot exist in isolation. It must consider
the descriptive reality of our modem constitutional system and the Supreme Court's role in
that system. Cf.Fiss, Conventionalism,58 S.CAL. L. REv. 177, 197 (1985) ("Theory informs
practice, just as surely as practice informs theory ...").
65. But cf.Chemerinsky, supra note 29 (arguing that the academic debate concerning
nonoriginalist review has given too much weight to the principle of majoritarian rule).
66. See, eg., supra notes 43-46 and accompanying text.

HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY

[Vol. 13:9

nonoriginalist review he contemplates, including a description of the
source or sources from which he believes nonoriginalist constitutional
values properly may be drawn.
A.

The Progressive Function of Nonoriginalist Review

I believe that nonoriginalist judicial review is legitimate as a matter
of political theory because it is capable of serving a vital function in our
society, a function sufficiently important that we as a society are willing
to accept its performance by the unelected Supreme Court.6 7 More specifically, I believe that the Supreme Court properly may further moral
progress in the United States by drawing nonoriginalist constitutional
values from the pattern of American moral development, as revealed by
our history and traditions, our contemporary national values, and the
emerging trends of our national morality.
We evidence our nation's morality most clearly through the adoption of legislative or other official governmental policies, but also in less
formal ways-through societal customs and practices, for example, and
even through public opinion itself.68 Over the course of history, this evidence reveals an evolutionary transformation of American beliefs and
practices. At least on issues of individual rights, moreover, this longterm pattern of change tends to reflect positive moral growth.
It is difficult to deny the general proposition that America gradually
has developed answers to individual rights questions that are morally superior to the answers that came before. Thus, over our history, we have
come to reject the morality of prior practices once regarded as acceptable. Our society once endorsed a racially based system of slavery; we
now see racial discrimination as generally intolerable. We once denied
women many of the rights held by men, including even the basic right to
vote; we now regard most forms of gender-based discrimination as morally offensive and impermissible. And witness our recognition of greater
rights for the institutionalized,6 9 the handicapped,70 and the poor.7 1
67. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 638-58 (arguing that Congress' failure to adopt legislation
restricting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court reflects at least some measure of majoritarian
consent to the practice of nonoriginalist judicial review).
68. The nation's morality, in the sense I have in mind, depends primarily on its decisions
concerning what is right and wrong, and not so much on an independent evaluation of the
moral propriety of those decisions. Thus, the evidence of America's morality-its moral
stance-regarding any given issue includes all societal decisions that relate to that issue, even
decisions that some might consider "immoral" or "amoral." Nonetheless, as discussed in the
text, I believe that the resultant pattern of American moral development is likely to reflect
positive moral growth.
69. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 6000-6083 (1983 & Supp. 1985) (authorizing federal assistance for institutionalized and other persons with developmental disabilities).
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To say that America is on a general course of positive moral development concerning individual rights, however, is not to say that we always push forward on that course. To the contrary, as Professor Robert
N. Bellah has written, "Significant accomplishments in building a just
society have alternated with corruption and despair in America, as in
other lands, because the struggle to institutionalize humane values is endless on this earth."7 2 Although our general, long-term pattern of moral
development is likely to reflect moral growth and change for the better,
we act through temporary majorities reflecting temporary opinions. As a
result, we may deviate from our general course, or our progress may slow
to a halt. Thus, our long-term pattern of moral development is likely to
suggest answers that are morally superior to those of any transient majority, and it is here that the Supreme Court can play an important role
through the exercise of nonoriginalist review. By drawing nonoriginalist
constitutional values from America's long-term pattern of moral growth
and using those values to limit the power of transient majorities, the
Court can further the pursuit of answers that are morally sound.73
Under this method of nonoriginalist review, the ultimate source of
the Supreme Court's decisional norms lies not in a set of unchanging
values constitutionalized by the framers, but rather in the evolutionary
development of societal thinking concerning issues that implicate individual rights. Thus, whenever the Court is able to identify a historical
pattern of changing moral thought concerning a particular individual
rights question, the Court may properly invalidate governmental practices that lag behind the developing moral advance and conflict with
what has become the contemporary national morality. In like fashion,
the Court may also, in effect, push America forward on its course of
moral development by recognizing constitutional rights not yet supported by the contemporary morality, but supported by emerging socie70. See, e.g., 20 U.S.C.A. §§ 1400-1454 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (Education of the Handicapped Act).
71. Although some would contend that we have not done nearly enough, we have adopted
in recent decades a wealth of federal, state, and local poverty programs.
72. R. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION IN TIME OF
TRIAL 2 (1975).
73. Cf.Tennessee v. Garner, 105 S. Ct. 1694, 1705 (1985) (construing the Fourth Amendment to depart from the common law rule concerning police use of deadly force when "the
long-term movement has been away from the rule that deadly force may be used against any
fleeing felon, and [when] that remains the rule in less than half the States").
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tal values that are likely to prevail in the future.7 4
B. The Nationalizing Function of Nonoriginalist Review
As we have seen, nonoriginalist judicial review can serve a vital
function by supporting and furthering America's moral development.
Such review also can serve a second important function, related to the
first but of independent significance as well. This second function stems
from the national scope of the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings.
Through the recognition of constitutional rights, the Supreme Court
displaces state and local answers to questions concerning individual
rights and replaces them with nationalanswers, for the Court's constitutional rulings have nationwide application.7 5 At first glance, it might appear that this nationalizing effect of nonoriginalist review is dysfunctional
in the American governmental system. Professor Earl M. Maltz, for example, has argued that "local autonomy is a key concept in the American system, and . . . finding a value to be constitutionally protected
erodes this concept by forcing national standards on both the political
and judicial branches of state governments." 7 6 The recognition of na74. My analysis of nonoriginalist review as a vehicle for furthering American moral progress is drawn from a more elaborate discussion in Conkle, supra note 6, at 626-37.
In a recent opinion expressing the views of three Justices, Justice Marshall appears to
have adopted this suggested approach to nonoriginalist constitutional decisionmaking, at least
under the Equal Protection Clause:
Courts... do not sit or act in a social vacuum. Moral philosophers may debate
whether certain inequalities are absolute wrongs, but history makes clear that constitutional principles of equality, like constitutional principles of liberty, property, and
due process, evolve over time; what once was a natural and self-evident ordering later
comes to be seen as an artificial and invidious constraint on human potential and
freedom.... Shifting cultural, political, and social patterns at times come to make
past practices appear inconsistent with fundamental principles upon which American
society rests, an inconsistency legally cognizable under the Equal Protection Clause.
It is natural that evolving standards of equality come to be embodied in legislation.
When that occurs, courts should look to the fact of such change as a source of guidance on evolving principles of equality.
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S.Ct. 3249, 3268-69 (1985) (Marshall, J.,
joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (citations omitted).
75. The vast majority of the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking, of course,
involves the review of state and local practices, not federal ones.
76. Maltz, Federalism and the FourteenthAmendment: A Comment on Democracy and
Distrust, 42 OHIO ST. L.J. 209, 221 (1981). See id. at 216 ("[W]hatever one's theory of the
nature of fundamental rights and protected classes, it should be consistent with the basic concept of dual sovereignty that undergirds the constitutional system.").
The Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional rights does not entirely erode the concept of local autonomy. While its rulings set the minimum national standards for the protection of individual rights, states and localities may choose to set local standards that provide
more protection for individual rights than the Court has required. See generally infra notes
127-128 and accompanying text.

Fall 19851

NONORIGINALIST CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS

tional constitutional rights conflicts with the policy of federalism, a policy that favors state and local governmental decisionmaking.7 7
Federalism is an important governmental value.7" Local decisions
may be tailored to local conditions that differ from those prevailing elsewhere.7 9 They may also be tailored to differing local values, thereby permitting government to be more responsive to the wishes of more
Americans. 0 Finally, the variety of state and local jurisdictions provides
a "laboratory" for legal experimentation, permitting new and different
approaches to legal problems to be developed and tested and, if found
successful, eventually adopted on a broader geographic scale.8 1
77. See generally Linde, E Pluribus-ConstitutionalTheory and State Courts, 18 GA. L.
REv. 165, 193-200 (1984) (discussing the role of federalism in the determination of federal and
state constitutional rights).
78. To say that federalism is an important governmental value, of course, in itself says
nothing about the role of the judiciary vis-a-vis the political process in the protection of that
value. Cf Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005 (1985) (overruling
National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), in which the Supreme Court had
recognized a Tenth Amendment limitation on Congress' power to regulate state and local
governmental entities); J. CHOPER, supra note 5, at 171-259 (arguing that the Supreme Court
should abstain from deciding constitutional claims that the exercise of national power violates
"states' rights," leaving those questions instead to the national political branches). See generally Wechsler, The PoliticalSafeguards ofFederalism: The Role of the States in the Composition andSelection ofthe NationalGovernment, 54 COLUM. L. REV. 543 (1954) (suggesting that
the states, through the national political process, can protect themselves from intrusive federal
legislation).
79. Cf Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 264 (1983)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Since local conditions [reflecting occupational risks, climate, geography, and demography] generally determine how a job should be performed, and who should
perform it, the authority and responsibility for making employment decisions must be in the
hands of local governments, subject only to those restrictions unmistakably contemplated by
the Fourteenth Amendment.").
80. As Professor Maltz has noted, "the concept of pluralism is based on the idea that local
groups should generally be permitted to effectuate their own choices of basic values, even if
such values differ from those of the nation as a whole." Maltz, supra note 76, at 216 n.32. Cf
Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S. Ct. 1005, 1031-32 (1985) (Powell, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that democratic self-government operates most effectively and responsively at the state and local levels).
81. "It is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State
may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country." New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,
311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 265 (1983) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("Flexibility for experimentation not
only permits each state to find the best solutions to its own problems, it is the means by which
each state may profit from the experiences and activities of all the rest."); Williams v. Florida,
399 U.S. 78, 133 (1970) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (noting that federalism "leave[s] ample room
for governmental and societal experimentation in a society as diverse as ours").
Arguably, federalism might also serve another, independent purpose-protecting "the security of liberty in America ... [through] the dispersion of governmental power across a
federal system." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 173 (1968) (Harlan, J., dissenting). See
THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961). Assuming that the other benefits of
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In significant ways, however, Americans in the 1980's are closer together than ever before. We communicate instantaneously throughout
the length and breadth of the country. The national media reach every

hamlet.82 Not only do we learn quickly about matters of public interest
arising throughout the nation, but we frequently find ourselves physically
present in distant states and localities. We travel periodically for business and pleasure, and are prone to relocate for economic or personal
reasons.8 3 As a result of the remarkable twentieth-century transformation of communication practices and personal mobility in the United
States-a transformation that has accelerated in recent decades-we are
more likely than ever to know about, and to have reason to care about,

significant public policies in force in states and localities other than our
own.

84

On certain issues concerning individual rights, our interest in these
public policies goes well beyond mere curiosity. Abortion, the death penalty, "reverse" discrimination, homosexual rights, religion in the public
schools-issues such as these evoke intense and passionate feelings. They
touch us at the most basic levels of our morality and depend for their
resolution on our innermost values. Yet they are matters on which we
are bitterly divided.
federalism are outweighed by the need for national action, however, a removal of power from
the national government would seem a high price to pay for the incidental protection of individual liberty that might ensue. The argument reduces essentially to a call for governmental
inefficiency, a call that must be rejected in the governance of a complex society such as ours.
But ef Immigration and Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 950, 959 (1983) (recognizing "the need to divide and disperse power in order to protect liberty," even when the cost
is to "impose burdens on governmental processes that often seem clumsy, inefficient, even
unworkable...").
82. As Joshua Meyrowitz has observed:
Traditionally, neighborhoods, buildings, and rooms have confined people, not
only physically, but emotionally and psychologically as well. Now, physically
bounded spaces are less significant as information is able to flow through walls and
rush across great distances. As a result, where one is has less and less to do with
what one knows and experiences.
J. MEYROWITZ, No SENSE OF PLACE: THE IMPACT OF ELECTRONIC MEDIA ON SOCIAL

BEHAVIOR, at viii (1985) (emphasis in original).
83. American families move an average of every four years, and many of these moves
reflect interstate migrations. See The Legacies of World War I1 U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 5, 1985, at 38, 41; U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT
POPULATION REPORTS, POPULATION CHARACTERISTICS SERIES P-20,
GRAPHIC MOBILITY: MARCH 1982 TO MARCH 1983, at I (Table A).

No. 393,

GEO-

84. As Dean Sandalow has written, "Increased mobility and the growth of mass communication have more and more led us to see ourselves as one nation and, together with a rising
egalitarianism, have led to a reduced willingness to treat each state as a separate political
community." Sandalow, supra note 3, at 1042. But cf Schambra, ProgressiveLiberalism and
American "Community" PUB. INTEREST, Summer 1985, at 31 (arguing that the idea of a
national American community, in many respects, has declined in recent years).
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Despite our deep divisions on these questions of individual rights,
the questions require answers, and they must be American answers. On
moral issues such as these, there are no differing local conditions sufficient to justify differing local answers, and local "experimentation" is
hardly well-suited to moral inquiry. Moreover, although the prevailing
moral values of our citizenry may well differ by state or region, the pluralistic benefits of federalism are outweighed in this sphere by the interests of our national political community, a community that is growing
closer together every day.85 The issues simply are too important to
America, and too basic to each of our citizens, to be subject to geographic disparity.8 6 They cry out for national resolution,87 which the

Supreme Court can provide through the recognition of nonoriginalist
constitutional rights.88
In the exercise of nonoriginalist judicial review, then, the Supreme
Court can perform the progressive function of furthering the cause of
American moral growth and, in addition, the independently significant
function of nationalizing our governmental policies concerning controversial individual rights. These functions overlap, for whenever the
Court recognizes a constitutional right in furtherance of American moral
85. Perhaps differing local values are no less a differing local condition than geography,
climate, or demography. But this is a matter of terminology that in no way affects my basic
claim: even if characterized as a differing local condition, a difference in local values cannot
overcome the need for a national resolution of the issues that I describe.
86. Arguably, the problem of geographic disparity is mitigated by the very mobility that I
have discussed. Given their mobility, American citizens might choose to establish and maintain their residence in political communities adhering to their own views on the individual
rights issues that concern them most. Witness, for example, the prominent homosexual population in San Francisco. However important these various issues may be, however, they rarely
provide sufficient reason either to justify or to prevent relocation. And to the extent that they
do, there is a genuine risk of Balkanizing the American polity, a risk that carries potentially
extreme consequences. We dare not forget, for example, that one fundamental issue of individual rights so divided our society by state and region that it led to a civil war.
87. Cf Koukoutchos, A No-Win Proposalon Abortion Rights, N.Y. Times, July 25, 1985,
at A23 col. I ("Fundamental rights, unlike liquor regulations or traffic laws, should not vary
from state to state."). See generally R. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 193 (1985) ("Some minimum homogeneity of social institutions is necessary if people are
to consider themselves Americans first and Georgians or New Yorkers second.").
88. The resolution of these questions on a nationwide basis-presenting a unified American position-might also facilitate the role of the United States as an international leader on
questions of individual rights. See generally Barber, The Soul of Foreign Policy: Rights, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 29, 1984, at A23 col. 2 (arguing that "human rights ought to be the soul of United
States foreign policy"). Indeed, some might contend that my focus on American answers is too
narrow-that there are universally correct answers to moral questions that do not depend on
national boundaries. Whatever the strength of that position, it does not affect my argument
here. My point is merely that American answers are preferable to state and local ones on
highly controversial issues of individual rights. I make no claim, and have no need to claim,
that American answers are preferable to any universal moral truth that might exist.
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progress, it also provides a national resolution for the issue that it confronts. The nationalizing function, however, also can operate separately:
even when there is no pattern of American moral development concerning a controversial question of individual rights, the need for a national
resolution remains, and the Court can provide that resolution through
the recognition of a national constitutional right.8 9
C. The Functional Operation of Nonoriginalist Review: The Problem of
Judicial Finality Revisited
By identifying two important functions that nonoriginalist judicial
review can serve, I have offered a theoretical defense of this governmental practice.9 0 But the problem is more complex, because nonoriginalist
review, as presently constituted, includes the doctrine of judicial finality.
I must therefore consider the functional operation of nonoriginalist review in light of this basic doctrine.
On some issues of individual rights, the pattern of American morality is relatively clear, and the Supreme Court thus is reasonably capable
of providing "final" answers in its identification of contemporary and
emerging moral principles. For example, the pattern of our society's
thinking concerning racial discrimination was sufficiently clear in 1954
that Brown v. Board of Education91 may be viewed as a decision that
correctly predicted, and thereby accelerated, the development of
America's morality in this area. 92 Likewise, the Court's elevated standard of review in evaluating gender-based classifications seems quite in
keeping with our evolving national beliefs concerning the offensiveness of
gender discrimination. 93 Indeed, the gender-based discrimination cases
89. The recognition of national constitutional rights does not prevent states and localities

from being more protective of individual rights than the Supreme Court has required. See
supra note 76. Moreover, if one or more states or localities in fact takes a more protective

approach, the nationalizing effect of the Court's constitutional rulings is to that extent diminished. See infra notes 127-128 and accompanying text.
90. My position defending the legitimacy of nonoriginalist judicial review in fact includes
another essential component--evidence of majoritarian consent to the practice through Congress' failure to adopt legislation restricting the Supreme Court's appellate jurisdiction. See
Conkle, supra note 6, at 638-58. See also supra note 67 and accompanying text.
91. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
92. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 635.
93. In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), for example, the plurality opinion
cited congressional action reflecting an enhanced societal sensitivity to gender-based
classifications:
We might also note that, over the past decade, Congress has itself manifested an
increasing sensitivity to sex-based classifications. In Tit. VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, for example, Congress expressly declared that no employer, labor union, or
other organization subject to the provisions of the Act shall discriminate against any
individual on the basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Similarly, the
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exemplify a broad class of cases in which the Court properly recognizes
constitutional rights on the basis of moral principles that already have
grown to command national support. These cases typically involve the
invalidation of state or local governmental practices that lag behind developing national standards, as reflected, for example, in the policies of
Congress or of a majority of the states. In such cases, the Court need not
attempt the difficult task of predicting the future course of American
moral progress, for the governing norms may be drawn from the contemporary national morality.94 Whenever the Court, with a fair degree of
confidence, can determine this contemporary morality-or in a rare case
such as Brown, the emerging American morality-nonoriginalist judicial
review can properly serve its progressive function and, incidentally, its

nationalizing function as well.95

On certain matters, however, America's evolving morality is far
from clear. There may be an apparent pattern of moral development, but
one that is incomplete or uncertain. In such cases, nonoriginalist review
falters in its progressive function. If there is an apparent pattern of
moral development, the cause of moral growth might well be furthered
by the recognition of a constitutional right. Given the finality of such a
judicial ruling, however, the Supreme Court may be reluctant to act in
the absence of a more compelling case. 96 Conversely, the Court might
Equal Pay Act of 1963 provides that no employer covered by the Act "shall discriminate... between employees on the basis of sex" And section I of the Equal Rights
Amendment, passed by Congress on March 22, 1972, and submitted to the legislatures of the States for ratification, declares that "[e]quality of rights under the law
shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of
sex." Thus, Congress itself has concluded that classifications based upon sex are
inherently invidious, and this conclusion of a coequal branch of Government is not
without significance to the question presently under consideration.
Id. at 687-88 (plurality opinion) (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
94. See, e.g., Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 300 (1983) (holding a life sentence for a nonviolent recidivist unconstitutional when it appeared that the defendant had been punished "more
severely than he would have been in any other State"); Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383
U.S. 663, 666 n.4 (1966) (invalidating Virginia's poll tax when "[o]nly a handful of States"
continued to employ such taxes at the time the Court rendered its decision); Griswold v. Connecticut 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (invalidating a statute that criminalized the use of contraceptives, even by married persons, when Connecticut was the only state that criminalized this
practice); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956) (plurality opinion) (recognizing a constitutional requirement of publicly provided transcripts on appeal for indigent criminal defendants
when most states had already recognized the need for providing such transcripts).
95. In many constitutional cases, of course, the Supreme Court finds substantial guidance
in its prior precedents. See Sedler, supra note 8, at 118-19. The use and development of such
a body of precedents, moreover, can serve the important purpose of reconciling and harmonizing various aspects of the developing American morality. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 637
n.183.
96. Such reluctance would reflect a well-grounded concern about the disabling effects of a
constitutional ruling on the majoritarian process. Cf California v. Carney, 105 S. Ct. 2066,
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recognize a constitutional right on the basis of uncertain evidence. If so,
the Court's decision might not reflect the actual pattern of national moral
development at all. The Court's decision, in other words, might be
wrong-wrong, but nonetheless immunized from majoritarian correction
by the doctrine of judicial finality.
The recognition of any constitutional right, even one that fails to
reflect the developing American morality, does serve the nationalizing
function of nonoriginalist review. But this function also is frustrated by
the doctrine of judicial finality. The nationalizing function, standing
alone, could be performed as well by Congress as by the Supreme Court,
for it is the existence of a national standard that counts for this purpose,
not its source or content. Yet because Congress is prone to avoid controversial questions of individual rights,97 leaving these matters entirely to
Congress may be tantamount to leaving them unresolved. Judicial action, on the other hand, coupled with the doctrine of judicial finality,
seriously undercuts the principle of majoritarian policymaking. It simply
will not do in a democratic society to have the Supreme Court imposing
"final" answers merely for the sake of achieving national standards that
could better be provided by the popularly elected national legislature.
When faced with legislative intransigence, however, the failure of the
Supreme Court to act may mean that we will have no national standards
at all. Thus, the nationalizing potential of nonoriginalist review remains
unfulfilled, inhibited by the doctrine of judicial finality.
These problems may be highlighted by examining three of the most
controversial individual rights issues confronting the modern Supreme
Court: abortion, homosexual rights, and "reverse" racial discrimination.
In each of these areas, there may be evidence of a pattern of American
moral development, but the evidence remains fragmentary and uncertain.
Nonetheless, the issues raise fundamental moral questions that demand
national resolution. In cases such as these, the prevailing model of nonoriginalist review is severely impeded by the doctrine of judicial finality.
The Supreme Court addressed the issue of abortion in its 1973 decision in Roe v. Wade. 98 At the time Roe was decided, there appeared to
2073 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("The breadth of this Court's mandate counsels greater
patience before we offer our binding judgment on the meaning of the Constitution.").
97. There are notable exceptions, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting
Rights Act of 1965. These are exceptions, however, because members of Congress typically
avoid any controversy that might jeopardize their incumbency. As California Supreme Court
Justice Roger J. Traynor has noted, "Legislators have become astute at turning a deaf ear to
highly visible issues on which they do not wish to gamble their political lives." Traynor, The
Limits of Judicial Creativity, 63 IowA L. REv. 1, 8 (1977).

98. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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be a liberalizing trend in favor of a woman's right to have an abortion,99
and the Court's decision giving constitutional protection to that right
might be viewed as an attempt to discern and give effect to an emerging
American morality on this issue.1" The evidence of a moral pattern in
1973, however, offered exceedingly weak support for the Court's decision, 0 1 and, even today, the debate over abortion continues largely unabated. Although Roe provided a national answer to this fundamental
issue of individual rights, and that in itself was important, 10 2 the answer
might not accurately reflect the pattern of American moral development.
Yet the 0Court's
decision remains protected by the doctrine of judicial
finality. 1 3
99. By the end of the 1950's, a large majority of the jurisdictions banned abortion,
however and whenever performed, unless done to save or preserve the life of the
mother. The exceptions, Alabama and the District of Columbia, permitted abortion
to preserve the mother's health. Three states permitted abortions that were not "unlawfully" performed or that were not "without lawful justification," leaving interpretation of those standards to the courts. In the past several years, however, a trend
toward liberalization of abortion statutes has resulted in adoption, by about one-third
of the States, of less stringent laws, most of them patterned after the ALI Model
Penal Code § 230.3.
Id. at 139-40 (footnotes omitted). See Maltz, Murderin the Cathedral-TheSupreme Court as
Moral Prophet, 8 U. DAYTON L. REv. 623, 630-31 (1983) ("Through the legislative process of
exchange of views and compromise, state laws were being reformed, with a gradual but perceptible drift toward liberalization.").
100. Writing in 1976, for example, Professor Perry defended Roe as a decision that "struck
down laws that were contrary to the evolving, maturing conventions of the moral culture."
Perry, EthicalFunction, supra note 45, at 735.
101. By the time Roe was decided, fourteen states had liberalized their abortion laws by
passing legislation patterned on section 230.3 of the Model Penal Code, which permitted a
licensed physician to perform an abortion, under specified conditions, if he found a "substantial risk that continuance of the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health
of the mother or that the child would be born with grave physical or mental defect, or that the
pregnancy resulted from rape, incest, or other felonious intercourse." MODEL PEN. CODE
§ 230.3(2). See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 140 n.37 (1973). Even in these fourteen states,
however, abortions under most circumstances still were prohibited as criminal offenses. Only
four states had recognized a relatively unrestricted right to abortion during early pregnancy.
See id.
102. Cf Koukoutchos, supra note 87 ("If a woman has a basic right to decide whether or
not to have children, shouldn't she have this right regardless of her state of residence? And if
the right to life is sacred, shouldn't it be just as protected in Los Angeles as in Little Rock?").
103. As Professor Maltz has observed, "In the absence of a constitutional amendment, the
standards set out in Roe have been viewed by all concerned as the unalterable base from which
further debate must proceed." Maltz, supra note 99, at 631. Cf id. at 630-31 (arguing that the
Court's decision in Roe inhibited an ongoing debate concerning the legality of abortion).
Due to the finality of Roe, even Congress has been precluded from directly addressing,
and perhaps resolving, the conflicting moral considerations that affect the issue of abortion.
Perhaps as a result, Congress has responded to the Court's decision with a "compromise" that
it does consider to be within its constitutional power, but that reflects a policy judgment many
would regard as unseemly, if not shameful: a judgment disfavoring the right to abortion, but
only at the expense of the poor, a group whose abortion rights the Supreme Court has been
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Consider, by contrast, the Supreme Court's response to the issue of

homosexual rights. In a summary decision in 1976, the Court rejected a
claim of constitutional protection for consensual homosexual relations, 10 4 and, on several recent occasions, the Court has refused to address other questions involving homosexual rights."0 5 Although
developing societal beliefs concerning homosexual rights remain uncertain, the evidence would suggest an emerging American morality that
would favor the protection of such rights.10 6 These questions, moreover,
unwilling to protect. See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980) (upholding the constitutionality of the federal "Hyde Amendment," which generally prohibited the use of federal funds to
reimburse abortion costs under the Medicaid program). See also Perry, Why the Supreme
Court was Plainly Wrong in the Hyde Amendment Case: A Brief Comment on Harris v. McRae, 32 STAN. L. REv.1113 (1980). For a discussion of other congressional responses to Roe,
see infra note 149.
104. Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976), af'g 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D.
Va. 1975). Given the summary nature of the decision as well as subsequent developments in
the Supreme Court, the precedential status of Doe is open to serious question. See Saphire,
supra note 9, at 772-77. Indeed, the Eleventh Circuit recently found that consensual homosexual relations are entitled to presumptive constitutional protection, the Supreme Court's decision in Doe notwithstanding. See Hardwick v. Bowers, 760 F.2d 1202, 1207-10 (11th Cir.
1985). The Supreme Court, however, has granted certiorari to review the Eleventh Circuit's
decision. See 106 S.Ct. 342 (1985).
105. In its 1983-84 Term, for example, the Court dismissed a challenge to a New York law
that criminalized loitering for the purpose of homosexual solicitation on the ground that its
prior grant of certiorari had been improvident. See New York v. Uplinger, 104 S.Ct. 2332
(1984) (per curiam). In its 1984-85 Term, over the dissent of two Justices, the Court denied
certiorari in a case contesting the dismissal of an Ohio high school guidance counselor who
was bisexual and who had revealed this fact to her co-workers. See Rowland v. Mad River
Local School Dist., 105 S.Ct. 1373 (1985). In the same term, the Court also disposed of a
challenge to an Oklahoma statute that permitted the dismissal of public school teachers for
"advocating" or "encouraging" homosexuality, affirming the lower court decision by an
equally divided vote and without any written opinions, thereby providing neither a national
precedent nor any other guidance on the issues presented. See Board of Educ. v. National Gay
Task Force, 105 S.Ct. 1858 (1985), affg 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984). For a listing of
numerous other cases in which the Supreme Court has refused to consider questions involving
homosexual rights, see Katz, Sexual Morality and the Constitution: People v. Onofre, 46 ALB.
L. REV. 311, 341 n.167 (1982).
106. In the last quarter century, for example, some twenty-three state legislatures have
decriminalized homosexual activity conducted in private by consenting adults. See Rivera,
OurStraight-LacedJudges: The Legal Position of Homosexual Personsin the United States, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 799, 950-51 (1979) (listing twenty-one states); see also 1978 N.J. LAWS, ch. 95
§ 2C:98-2 (effective Sept. 1, 1979) (repealing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:143-1 (West 1969)); 1983
Wis. LAWS, Act. 17 § 5 (effective May 12, 1983) (amending Wis. STAT. ANN. § 944.17 (West
1982)). Cf Commonwealth v. Balthazar, 366 Mass. 298, 302, 318 N.E.2d 478, 481 (1974)
(construing Massachusetts sodomy statute not to reach private activity by consenting adults).
Similar patterns of change, moreover, might support a more general principle of nondiscrimination against homosexuals. Cf Annual Meeting of the American Bar Association, 54
U.S.L.W. 2037, 2040 (July 16, 1985) (discussing the ABA House of Delegates' narrow rejection of a resolution that "without approving or endorsing homosexual activity" would have
urged "federal, state and local governments to adopt legislation prohibiting discrimination in
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perhaps no less than the issue of abortion, are of such societal and individual importance as to require resolution on a nationwide basis. Perhaps concerned by the finality of its judgments, however, the Supreme
Court has refused to protect these rights, and a national resolution of
10 7
these questions has yet to be attained.
The propriety of "reverse" or "compensatory" racial discrimination-the discrimination resulting from preferential treatment for racial
groups that have been victimized in the past-is one of the most difficult
individual rights issues of our time. Given the complex moral considerations involved, it is not surprising that our society's moral stance on this
issue remains in flux; nor is it surprising that the Supreme Court has been
unable to provide any clear guidance in this area. °8 Nevertheless, the
issue demands a national resolution, which the Court might better promote were it not induced to caution by the impending finality of its conemployment, housing and public accomodations on the basis of sexual orientation"). See generally Slovenko, Foreward-The Homosexual and Society: A Historical Perspective, 10 U.
DAYTON L. REV.445 (1985).

107. Currently before the Court is a case that could be used as a vehicle for according
constitutional protection to consensual homosexual relations. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S.
Ct. 342 (1985), granting cert to 760 F.2d 1202 (11th Cir. 1985). Given the Court's prior
reluctance to recognize homosexual rights, however, the Court may well use the case merely to
reaffirm its earlier refusal to grant the requested constitutional protection. See also supra note
104. Cf. Rowland v. Mad River Local School Dist., 105 S.Ct. 1373, 1378 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting from denial of certiorari) ("Whether constitutional rights are infringed in sexual
preference cases, and whether some compelling state interest can be advanced to permit their
infringement, are important questions that this Court has never addressed, and which have left
the lower courts in some disarray."); Saphire, supra note 9, at 809 ("[W]hatever the reason for
[the Supreme Court's] failure (reluctance? unwillingness?) thus far to explicitly extend the
right to privacy to homosexual relations, the jurisprudential framework established by its modem privacy decisions points logically to such a result.").
108. The Court has considered the constitutionality of compensatory racial discrimination
in two prominent cases, but each was decided with multiple, conflicting opinions and without
the benefit of a majority rationale. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980); Regents of
the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978). Although the Court also had granted review
in two additional cases raising similar issues, it disposed of each without reaching the merits.
See Johnson v. Board of Educ., 457 U.S. 52 (1982) (per curiam) (remanding for consolidation
with a related case); Minnick v. California Dep't of Corrections, 452 U.S. 105 (1981) (dismissing the writ of certiorari on the ground that the lower court decision was not "final"
within the meaning of the Supreme Court's jurisdictional statute).
Recently, the Court granted certiorari in yet another case involving this problem. See
Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984), cert. granted, 105 S.Ct. 2015
(1985). The Court also has granted certiorari in two additional cases involving issues of compensatory racial discrimination arising under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. See
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir.), cert. granted
sub nom. Local 28 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 106 S.Ct. 58 (1985); Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir.), cert.granted sub nom. Local
No. 93, International Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S.Ct. 59 (1985).
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stitutional decisions. 10 9
On each of these issues, the functional operation of nonoriginalist
judicial review has been hindered by the doctrine of judicial finality. As
to abortion, the Court's decision in Roe v. Wade may well have frustrated, not furthered, our moral development on this issue, for it is not at
all clear that the "final" answer provided by the Court is an answer that
the American society either embraces now or is likely to embrace in the
foreseeable future. As for homosexual rights, on the other hand, the very
prospect of a "final" judicial decision may have induced the Court to
inaction, thereby leaving unfulfilled not only the progressive function of
nonoriginalist review, but the nationalizing function as well. The prospect of finality likewise may be inhibiting the Court in the area of compensatory racial discrimination, an area in which the Court might
otherwise at least be able to serve the nationalizing function of nonoriginalist review by developing a national response to this problem.
My concern about the doctrine of judicial finality, of course, is
linked to my functional defense of nonoriginalist judicial review, a defense that justifies this practice on the basis of its progressive and nationalizing functions. Perhaps nonoriginalist review serves other functions as
well.°1 1 If so, there may be different implications for the doctrine of judicial finality. But unless one is willing to reject entirely the utility of the
functions I have described, one cannot avoid the conclusion that a uniform application of the doctrine of judicial finality reduces the utility of
nonoriginalist review. At least to the extent that nonoriginalist review is
or can be designed to further these progressive and nationalizing functions, the doctrine of judicial finality can work to frustrate the operation
of this practice.
III.

Reshaping Judicial Review: Toward a Model of Final and
Provisional Constitutional Decisionmaking

I have no doubt that any radical proposal for reshaping judicial review would be rejected, and properly so. The practice is a well ingrained
and fundamental component of our governmental system, and it gener109. Justice Stevens, for one, clearly feels the need for caution in this area, given "the risk
of error associated with the ultimate judicial resolution of the underlying constitutional questions" raised by compensatory racial discrimination. See Stevens, JudicialRestraint,22 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 437, 446 (1985). Moreover, due to the doctrine of judicial finality, Stevens'
caution requires him to endorse a policy of Supreme Court "procrastination and indecision"
on these important constitutional questions. See id. at 443. See also id. at 443-46.
110. See, e.g., J. ELY, supra note 5 (arguing that judicial review serves a "representationreinforcing" function); M. PERRY, supra note 3, at 102 (suggesting that the Supreme Court
may be capable of seeking out the "right answers to political-moral problems").
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ally has served our nation well. Yet the very importance of judicial review demands that it operate at a functionally optimal level, and I have
identified significant functional problems in the operation of nonoriginalist judicial review. I therefore am prepared to suggest, and to attempt to
justify, a modest revision in the Supreme Court's institutional practice.
I propose that the Supreme Court abandon the doctrine of judicial
finality in selected individual rights cases. In such cases, the Court
would recognize constitutional rights, but would announce that its decisions were provisional in nature, that is, subject to modification by congressional action. These decisions by the Court would provide governing
constitutional standards unless or until Congress addressed the issues in
question, in which case the congressional action would thereafter prevail.
In the exercise of this provisional judicial review, ' the Supreme
Court would act much as it does in policing state actions under the "dormant" Commerce Clause. In that area, the Court's decisions finding
state actions unconstitutional can be overturned by Congress if it elects
to authorize the state actions under attack." 2 Under my proposed
model, provisional rulings concerning individual rights would have a
similar constitutional status.
A.

A Functional Justification of Provisional Judicial Review

The utility of provisional judicial review springs from the deficiencies of final judicial review. The doctrine of judicial finality shields nonoriginalist constitutional decisions from subsequent legislative action,
even when such action might better reflect the developing American morality and might thereby further American moral progress to a greater
extent than the Supreme Court's judicial decisions. If the Court fails to
act, however, both the progressive and the nationalizing functions of
nonoriginalist review go entirely unfulfilled. Provisional review would
fill this void, providing an important supplement to final review in the
service of these functions.
In furthering the progressive function of nonoriginalist review, a
provisional constitutional ruling typically would address a state or local,
111. I borrow my terminology from Professor Paul R. Dimond. See Dimond, Provisional
Review: An Exploratory Essay on an Alternative Form of Judicial Review, 12 HASTINGS
CONsT. L.Q. 201 (1985). Dimond's model of provisional review, however, and his justifications
for that model, differ markedly from those presented here. See infra note 165 and accompanying text.
112. As the Court recently noted in Northeast Bancorp., Inc. v. Board of Governors of the
Fed. Reserve Sys., 105 S. Ct. 2545, 2554 (1985), "When Congress so chooses, state actions
which it plainly authorizes are invulnerable to constitutional attack under the Commerce
Clause."
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as opposed to a national, governmental practice. Such a ruling would be
appropriate when the Supreme Court perceived a pattern of national
moral growth justifying the recognition of a constitutional right, but
when the Court lacked sufficient confidence to make its own judgment
conclusive on Congress, the most broadly based and representative national political body. The Court thus would offer an immediate opinion
on the issue in question, based on its assessment of American values, and
at the same time invite Congress to disagree if it wished to provide a
different national resolution.
The issues of abortion and homosexual rights provide useful examples. Faced in 1973 with a distinct but hardly definitive trend toward the
liberalization of state abortion laws," 3 the Supreme Court could have
made its ruling in Roe v. Wade"' provisional, thereby giving constitutional effect to what it perceived as an emerging national morality without foreclosing a congressional reconsideration of the Court's judgment.
Likewise, the option of a provisional ruling might permit the hesitant
Court to respond to the issue of homosexual rights; if the pattern of
American moral development is insufficiently clear to permit a final judicial resolution of this problem, surely it is clear enough to permit a provisional decision that gives some type of protection to these rights.1 15 The
Court said too much in Roe v. Wade; it has said too little on homosexual
rights. Provisional review could provide the Supreme Court with an important middle ground, one that would permit it to enter the debate without concluding it.
The progressive function of provisional review generally would operate to invalidate state and local policies on which Congress had not yet
spoken. Occasionally, however, even congressional action might seem
inconsistent with national moral standards. This might be true, for example, if the federal legislation is dated and is no longer in tune with the
evolving national morality 6 or if it has been adopted without a full con113. See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
114. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
115. See supra note 106 and accompanying text.
116. Dean Guido Calabresi has argued that courts should be permitted, as a matter of
nonconstitutional doctrine, to update or to induce legislative reconsideration of obsolete statutes. See G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES (1982). Although
Calabresi rejects the use of constitutional judicial review as an appropriate means for policing
legal obsolescence, see id. at 8-30, his nonconstitutional approach roughly approximates my
model of provisional constitutional decisionmaking insofar as it involves the review of obsolete
federal statutes.
Beyond this similarity, however, our theories and models differ fundamentally. Because
his work is limited to the problem of legal obsolescence, Calabresi does not address the broader
functions of nonoriginalist judicial review that I have identified. Not surprisingly, therefore,
his nonconstitutional model is not well suited to the performance of these functions. Indeed,
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sideration of the moral issues at stake. "7 In either situation, the
Supreme Court might invalidate the legislation under attack based on
Congress' apparent deviation from the nation's morality."' Yet it might
also be proper for the Court to accept a subsequent congressional reaffirmation of the same policy, if Congress based its reaffirmation on a thorough legislative consideration of contemporary moral values. If so, a
provisional invalidation of the federal statute would be the Court's most
appropriate action.
Justice Stevens suggested this type of response to congressional legislation in his dissenting opinion in Fullilove v. Klutznick." 9 Although a
majority of the Supreme Court upheld a minority set-aside requirement
in a public works funding measure, Stevens was deeply troubled by Congress' failure to consider the moral implications of compensatory racial
discrimination:
The very fact that Congress for the first time in the Nation's history has created a broad legislative classification for entitlement to
benefits based solely on racial characteristics identifies a dramatic
difference between this Act and the thousands of statutes that preceded it. This dramatic point of departure is not even mentioned
in the statement of purpose of the Act or in the Reports of either
the House or the Senate Committee that processed the legislation,
and was not the subject of any testimony or inquiry in any legislaCalabresi's model might well frustrate the pursuit of nationalmoral progress and the nationalization of our society's approach to controversial individual rights issues by reducing the role of
the Supreme Court in the review of state and local policies, the "updating" of which would be
left largely to the various state courts. See id. at 201 n.43 (suggesting that the review of state
and local legislation generally would lack a federal constitutional predicate, and that therefore
the Supreme Court and other federal courts generally would lack subject-matter jurisdiction in
these cases).
117. As Dean Sandalow has argued, "Legislation that has failed to engage the attention of
Congress ... is likely to be the product of partial political pressures that are not broadly
reflective of the society as a whole." Sandalow, JudicialProtection of Minorities, 75 MICH. L.
REv. 1162, 1188 (1977). Cf Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term-Forward: The
Court and the Economic System, 98 HARV. L. RaV. 4, 15 (1984) ("People demand laws just as
they demand automobiles, and some people demand more effectively than others."); Perry,
EthicalFunction, supra note 45, at 727 ("[A] piece of legislation might have been put on the
books only because a sufficiently interested minority has lobbied-and perhaps bartered-for
it.").
118. National legal standards can be established by federal administrative action as well as
by statute. Such administrative standards are much more likely to deviate from the national
morality than are statutory enactments, for Congress might not have given any consideration
to the moral implications of the administrative action. Cf Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426
U.S. 88, 105 (1976) (invalidating a United States Civil Service Commission regulation that
discriminated against resident aliens despite the fact that the Commission's discriminatory
employment practice might have been upheld "if the Congress or the President had expressly
imposed the citizenship requirement").
119. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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tive hearing on the bill that was enacted. It is true that there was a
brief discussion on the floor of the House as well as in the Senate
on two different days, but only a handful of legislators spoke and
there was virtually no debate.' 2 °
Concerned as he was with Congress' "perfunctory consideration of an
unprecedented policy decision of profound constitutional importance to
the Nation,"' 2 1 Stevens preferred not to make "a final determination that
the substance of the decision" was unconstitutional. 2 2 Instead, he urged
"a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality based on a failure to
follow procedures that guarantee the kind of deliberation that a fundamental constitutional issue of this kind obviously merits."12 3 Stevens
thus would have ruled the congressional legislation provisionally unconstitutional "because it simply raises too many serious questions that Congress failed to answer or even to address in a responsible way."' 2 4
Provisional judicial review of congressional as well as state and local
governmental actions thus could assist the Supreme Court in the performance of its progressive function. Provisional review also could assist
the Court in its nationalizing function. Unlike the progressive function
of judicial review, the nationalizing function relates exclusively to matters that Congress has not yet addressed and that therefore are subject to
divergent state and local policies. Even an obsolete or ill-conceived federal statute, after all, does provide a national policy, which is all the nationalizing function requires.' 2 5 When there is no such federal
legislation, however, judicial review can serve its nationalizing function
through the recognition of national constitutional standards. Provisional
review, moreover, is uniquely well-suited to promoting national standards for the protection of individual rights.
120. Id. at 549-50 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
121. Id. at 550.
122. See id. at 551.
123. Id. at 552.
124. Id. Cf Delaware Tribal Business Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 97-98 (1977) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that Congress' failure to include a particular group of American
Indians in a reparations award was unconstitutionally discriminatory, in part because it was
"the consequence of a legislative accident, perhaps caused by nothing more than the unfortunate fact that Congress is too busy to do all of its work as carefully as it should") (emphasis in
original); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977) (Stevens, J.,concurring in the
judgment) ("Perhaps an actual, considered legislative choice would be sufficient to allow this
[social security statute discriminating on the basis of gender] to be upheld. but that is a question I would reserve until such a choice has been made."). See generally Linde, Due Process of
Lawmaking, 55 NEB. L. REv. 197 (1976) (suggesting that due process should be construed to
require procedural safeguards in the enactment of legislation).
125. The nationalizing function also would be satisfied by a uniform national standard
adopted by federal administrative action. See generally supra note 118.
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Consider again the examples of abortion, homosexual fights, and
compensatory racial discrimination. I have argued that provisional constitutional rulings in these areas, at least as to abortion and homosexual
rights, would further the progressive function of nonoriginalist judicial
review.1 26 But even assuming the absence of a discernible pattern of
American moral development concerning any of these issues, they nonetheless command national attention and demand national resolution.
When Congress fails to provide this resolution, the Supreme Court can
do so through the recognition of federal constitutional rights. Although
the nationalizing function, standing alone, cannot justify final Supreme
Court rulings, it might nonetheless support provisional rulings creating
national standards that would remain subject to popular control through
congressional action. Thus, even if the American morality concerning
abortion, homosexual rights, and compensatory racial discrimination
were entirely unclear, the Court could rule provisionally in favor of the
protection of individual rights and against the majoritarian actions under
attack. In so doing, the Court would be providing immediate national
standards on these basic issues without an unduly "final" intrusion on
majoritarian polieymaking. Indeed, the Court would be promoting congressional consideration of important national issues it had previously
ignored, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of the national political
process.
I do not mean to suggest that judicial review, in its provisional form
or otherwise, is entirely effective in nationalizing our treatment of individual rights issues. The Supreme Court can establish only a minimum
national standard for the protection of individual rights. State and local
political bodies, or state courts acting under state constitutional provisions, can give more protection to individual rights than the Supreme
Court has mandated. Nothing in Roe v. Wade, 127 for example, would
prevent a state or local policy going beyond the standards that the Court
announced for the protection of a woman's right to have an abortion. To
the extent that this type of state or local policymaking occurs, the nationalizing effect of the Supreme Court's constitutional rulings is reduced.
As a result, the effectiveness of the nationalizing function of judicial review varies with the extent to which the Court adopts a stance sufficiently protective of individual rights that state and local officials are
disinclined to provide additional protection. 2 This is true as much for
126. See supra text accompanying notes 113-115.
127. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
128. Cf Oregon v. Elstad, 105 S. Ct. 1285, 1322 & n.44 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(arguing that recent Supreme Court decisions have been insufficiently protective and that such
decisions "are making this tribunal increasingly irrelevant in the protection of individual
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the provisional rulings I have described as it is for final constitutional
decisions.
In responding to a provisional Supreme Court ruling, however, Congress could adopt a national policy that would completely eliminate the
opportunity for state or local deviations.12 9 Had Roe v. Wade been decided provisionally, for example, Congress might have responded with
national legislation regulating the issue of abortion and displacing all
contrary state and local policies, whether more or less protective of a
right to abortion than the newly enacted national standard. Provisional
review therefore is a better vehicle than final review for achieving not
merely a minimum national standard for the protection of individual
rights, but a uniform national standard that completely resolves the issue. Neither a final nor a provisional constitutional ruling, in itself, can
ensure a uniform national standard. A provisional ruling, however, can
at least encourage Congress to provide such a standard, one that would
eliminate the potential for divergent state and local answers to a problem
0
that should not be subject to geographically disparate resolution. 13
There is a related constraint on the functional operation of judicial
review, including provisional review. The Supreme Court can further the
nationalizing function of nonoriginalist review only by recognizing constitutional limitations on majoritarian policymaking. This constraint, in
turn, directly affects the progressive function of nonoriginalist review, for
the type of national answer the Court can provide-one limiting the
power of majoritarian officials-might not reflect, and might even frustrate, the developing national morality concerning the issue in question.
On the issue of compensatory racial discrimination, for example, the
rights, and..

.

are requiring [state courts and legislatures] to shoulder the burden"). See

generally Brennan, State Constitutionsand the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARv. L.
REv. 489 (1977).

129. I do not mean to suggest that in the absence of any Supreme Court ruling, Congress
would lack the constitutional power to adopt such a national policy (subject, of course, to
judicial review). See infra note 161 (discussing the broad sweep of Congress' legislative
powers).
130. To say that Congress could provide a national legal standard is not to say that such a
standard necessarily would eliminate the potential for disparity within the limits of the congressional legislation. To draw an example from the area of homosexual rights, suppose that
Congress has decided to respond to a provisional Supreme Court decision holding that public
school systems cannot lawfully discriminate against homosexuals in the selection of elementary
school teachers. After full deliberation, Congress might conclude that homosexuality is a legitimate ground for discrimination in this context, but it would be unlikely to conclude that such
discrimination should in some way be mandated. Thus, the congressional legislation might
provide that "it shall not be unlawful" for any school system to discriminate in this way. Such
legislation would reflect a national moral judgment and would provide a national legal standard, but it nonetheless would permit individual school officials to decide whether or not to
discriminate in the manner authorized by Congress.
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Court could set a national standard by finally or provisionally invalidating state and local policies that call for such discrimination, but it could
not declare, to the contrary, that such policies must be the national
norm. Although I believe that the American morality concerning compensatory racial discrimination is in flux,"' it may be that emerging national values will support such discrimination. A national judicial
standard, therefore, would come only at the cost of potentially disserving
the progressive function of nonoriginalist review, for the Court could
provide a national answer only by imposing limitations on governmental
practices that in fact might further a developing national morality.
As a result of this problem, the Supreme Court ordinarily should
not recognize constitutional rights in order to serve the nationalizing
function of nonoriginalist review unless there is at least some evidence
that the recognition of such rights would also serve, or at least not disserve, the progressive function as well. A provisional constitutional ruling, however, would decidedly reduce the risk of frustrating the
developing American morality, for Congress could step in to authorize
whatever majoritarian policies the Court had provisionally rejected.
Thus, at least when the need for a national resolution is especially acute,
as perhaps is true for the problem of compensatory racial discrimination,
the Court properly could make a provisional ruling that might err on the
side of protecting individual rights,132 knowing that its decision could
readily be replaced by a new national standard of Congress' own
33
making.
None of this is to say that uniform national standards are always
desirable. Especially when issues of individual rights are in their early
stages of development, state and local officials, both political and judicial,
as well as the lower federal courts, can make important contributions to
the national dialogue.' 34 But after such issues have fermented and ma131. See supra text accompanying note 108.
132. By this I mean that the Court properly might err on the side of recognizing provisional constitutional limitations on the operation of state and local government. In some
sense, of course, there are "individual rights" on both sides of issues such as abortion and
compensatory racial discrimination. Cf Maltz, The Dark Side of State Court Activism, 63
TEX. L. REy. (forthcoming, page proofs at 312-16) (arguing that the adjudication of "individual rights" in fact involves the distribution of legal rights among various claimants).
133. Cf. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term-Forward: Constitutional Common
Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1, 29 (1975) ("Extending individual liberty on a common law basis...
triggers an important shift in the political process. The Court, in effect, opens a dialogue with
Congress, but one in which the factor of inertia is now on the side of individual liberty.")
(footnote omitted). See generally infra note 143.
134. Indeed, state courts may possess a greater competence than their federal counterparts
in evaluating the constitutionality of certain legal doctrines. See Sowle & Conkle, Comparative
Negligence Versus the Constitutional Guaranteeof Equal Protection: A HypotheticalJudicial
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tured, at least when the issues are highly controversial, a national resolution eventually should prevail. The issues of abortion, homosexual
rights, and compensatory racial discrimination seem to have reached this

stage. The consideration of other issues, however, might profit from continuing debate at the state and local levels.13 5
B.

A "Modest" Proposal?

In suggesting that the Supreme Court abandon the doctrine of judicial finality in certain constitutional cases, .1 have proposed a very basic
revision in the practice of judicial review. Yet I have asserted that this
proposal is "modest." In partial support of that assertion, I already have
noted the "provisional review" that the Court presently exercises under
the Commerce Clause,136 and I have discussed the provisional approach
advocated by Justice Stevens for certain cases involving individual
rights.1 3 7 In the remainder of this Article, I shall further explain the
modesty of my proposal by identifying additional precursors in the
Supreme Court's practice and doctrine and by emphasizing the limited
nature of my suggestion.
In the exercise of judicial review, the Supreme Court sometimes invalidates majoritarian actions without rendering final substantive decisions on the underlying issues of individual rights, thereby mitigating the
doctrine of judicial finality by permitting majoritarian officials to reconDecision, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1083, 1105-08 (arguing that state court judges have a special competence in evaluating constitutional challenges within the realm of tort law).
135. I have recognized that a national legal standard adopted by Congress in response to a
provisional constitutional ruling might permit a continued diversity in the conduct of state and
local officials. See supra note 130. Perhaps I should go one step further and concede that
Congress should be permitted to avoid making any national moral judgment at all by simply
declaring the issue in question to be one for state and local resolution. See Dimond, supra note
111, at 232 ("As the representative body for all the people, Congress should be free to determine by ordinary legislation whether a national standard or diverse state responses should
govern."). This would give Congress the ultimate authority to decide whether the issue demanded a national legal standard, and it would mitigate any federalism-based objection to the
model of judicial review that I have proposed. Cf Wechsler, supra note 78 (arguing that the
states can protect their own interests in the national political process). I am reluctant to make
such a concession, however, for it would significantly impede the nationalizing function of
provisional review. See supra notes 75-89 and accompanying text. The more highly controversial the issue of individual rights, the more important its national resolution. Yet the very
existence of controversy might well induce Congress to avoid such a resolution if it could
sidestep the issue by passing it back to state and local decisionmakers.
136. See supra note 112 and accompanying text. Professor William Cohen has argued that
Congress' power under the Commerce Clause should be read to exemplify a broader principle:
that Congress can validate any policy adopted by a state if Congress itself could constitutionally adopt that policy. See Cohen, Congressional Power to Validate Unconstitutional State
Laws: A Forgotten Solution to an Old Enigma, 35 STAN. L. REv. 387 (1983).
137. See supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text.
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sider, and perhaps readopt, the same substantive policies. These rulings
involve what might be called "structural" or "procedural" judicial review, and include, for example, rulings based on the constitutional doctrines governing legislative delegation, vagueness, and overbreadth. 13 s
When the Supreme Court invalidates majoritarian actions on these structural or procedural grounds, it may signal its disfavor with the substantive policies under attack without imposing final decisions on the
constitutional merits of those policies.' 3 9 In its consideration of the
death penalty, for example, the Court initially invalidated the penalty on
grounds that were essentially procedural," 4 thereby permitting legislatures to readopt the penalty-with procedural modifications-in reIn so doing, the Court temporarily
sponse to the Court's decision.'
ended the death penalty and forced its reconsideration by legislative officials, but left to those officials the final authority to determine whether
capital punishment should remain a part of the American system of jus-

tice. 42 The Court's constitutional jurisprudence thus already includes
structural and procedural judicial review, judicial review that, in some
138. See Wellington, The Nature of JudicialReview, 91 YALE L.J. 486, 504-09 (1982).
139. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 176 ("[A]n initial series of inconclusive dispositions
will often provoke the Justices to reflect out loud, as it were, about approaches to an enduring
solution, without as yet assuming responsibility for imposing one."); Kronman, Alexander
Bickel's Philosophy of Prudence, 94 YALE L.J. 1567, 1587 (1985) ("By offering a partial or
reversible solution to a constitutional problem, a solution that bespeaks its own uncertainty
regarding the principle or principles involved, the Court invites the other branches of government and the public, to rise to a consideration of principle and address the problem in the same
spirit.").
140. See Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239 (1972) (per curiam) (holding that "the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty" under its then-prevalent arbitrary and random administration constituted cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth
Amendment, as applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
141. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242
(1976); Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976).
142. Cf Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 179-81 (1976) (plurality opinion) ("The most
marked indication of society's endorsement of the death penalty for murder is the legislative
response to Furman.... [A]I of the post-Furmanstatutes make clear that capital punishment
itself has not been rejected by the elected representatives of the people."). A more deliberative
and thoughtful majoritarian response to Furman might have resulted had the Court made a
provisional ruling of the type I have suggested, for only Congress, and not the individual states,
could have reinstated the penalty in response to such a ruling. See generally C. BLACK, supra
note 46, at 40 (suggesting that "you can whoop and holler" legislation through many state
legislatures even when similar legislation would stand little chance of passing in Congress).
Not all of the Court's death penalty jurisprudence has been limited to structural or procedural judicial review. The Court has ruled, for example, that death is an unconstitutionally
disproportionate punishment for the crime of raping an adult woman, thereby precluding any
substantive judgment by legislators to the contrary. See Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584
(1977).
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sense at least, is "plainly non-final." 14' 3
Even when the Court renders substantive constitutional rulings that
it intends to be final, its rulings are not immune from criticism 1" and

indirect attacks by majoritarian officials, and these majoritarian responses to the Court's decisions may induce the Court to reevaluate its
own "final" rulings.14 5 The Court's "considered practice not to apply
14 6
stare decisis as rigidly in constitutional as in nonconstitutional cases"
permits it to consider majoritarian sentiments that otherwise would be
quelled by the doctrine of judicial finality.147 The majoritarian response
to Roe v. Wade,' for example, might eventually lead the Court to retreat from that holding.149
143. Wellington, supra note 138, at 504. The Supreme Court also can question the constitutional validity of substantive policies without making final constitutional rulings by interpreting federal statutes so as to render them free from constitutional doubt. See A. BICKEL,
supra note 46, at 164-66, 201-02. Likewise, through the use of what Professor Henry P.
Monaghan has called "constitutional common law," the Court can implement its basic constitutional doctrine with subconstitutional rules that may be subject to congressional modification. See generally Monaghan, supra note 133, at 2-3 (arguing that much of what passes for
authoritative constitutional doctrine "is best understood as something of a quite different order-a substructure of substantive, procedural, and remedial rules drawing their inspiration
and authority from, but not required by, various constitutional provisions; in short, a constitutional common law subject to amendment, modification, or even reversal by Congress").
144. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
145. Cf Dimond, supra note 111, at 234-35 ("[T]he Court's binding decisions have not
always proven final. They posit provisional answers that the people eventually accept or the
Court modifies or rejects.").
146. Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530, 543 (1962) (plurality opinion).
147. Cf. Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944) ("In constitutional questions, where
correction depends upon amendment and not upon legislative action this Court throughout its
history has freely exercised its power to reexamine the basis of its constitutional decisions.");
Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-07 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
("[I]n cases involving the Federal Constitution, where correction through legislative action is
practically impossible, this Court has often overruled its earlier decisions."). See generally
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2434 n.5 (1985) (plurality opinion) ("We see
no reason here to depart from the important and established principle of stare decisis. The
question we address involves only statutory construction, so any error we may commit is subject to reversal by Congress.").
148. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
149. According to John Agresto, "The most obvious example of congressional attempts to
minimize the impact of a particular decision is the body of legislation that was passed in response to the Court's abortion decrees." J. AGRESTO, supra note 5, at 130.
Congress had forbidden Medicaid payments for certain types of abortions, banned
the use of funds for abortions as a method of family planning under the Foreign
Assistance Act, banned fetal research, prohibited Legal Service attorneys from handling abortion-related cases, and passed a "conscience clause" amendment to the
Hill-Burton Act indicating Congress' continuing financial support for any hospital,
public or private, which refuses on the basis of religious or moral belief to perform
abortions. Many of these acts will come before the Court, and there they may be
overturned. But that fact in no way derogates from Congress' constitutional ability,
as an equal and independent branch of government, to enter into this type of consti-
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The doctrine of judicial finality thus is already subject to important
qualifications. Although the Supreme Court claims the final word in
constitutional adjudication, it sometimes acts without expressing a final
substantive position, and it likewise may revise its substantive judgments
in reaction to majoritarian opinion. As a result, the doctrine of judicial
finality does not always foreclose majoritarian officials from responding
effectively to constitutional invalidations with which they disagree. My
proposal to further limit the finality of judicial review therefore is not as
radical as it might seem, for the ground has already been broken.
Beyond these existing limitations on the doctrine of judicial finality,
there is more direct precedential support150 for my proposed model of
provisional judicial review, a model that would give Congress a special

role in defining the content of national constitutional rights. Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment expressly authorizes Congress "to enforce,
by appropriate legislation," the provisions of that amendment, 5 ' and the
tutional dialogue with the Court, through legislation, on matters of vital national
concern. The more important the issue, in fact, the more necessary the dialogue.
Id. at 130-31 (footnotes omitted). Agresto argues that Roe v. Wade and other constitutional
decisions are not as final as they appear because Congress, in effect, can force the Supreme
Court to reconsider its constitutional rulings. See id. at 125-31. See also Fisher, Constitutional
Interpretation by Members of Congress, 63 N.C.L. Rv. 707, 744-46 (1985). Cf Wellington,
supra note 138, at 502-04 (arguing that constitutional decisionmaking is not always more "final" than statutory interpretation).
The most recent majoritarian attack on Roe has taken the form of a specific request by the
Reagan administration for the Supreme Court to overrule its decision in that case. Filing an
amicus brief in two abortion cases currently pending before the Court, the administration has
argued that "the textual, doctrinal and historical basis for Roe v. Wade is so far flawed and...
is a source of such instability in the law that this Court should reconsider that decision and on
reconsideration abandon it." Brief for the United States an Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellants at 2, filed jointly in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 105 S.Ct. 2015 (1985), on appealfrom 737 F.2d 283 (3d Cir. 1984), and Diamond v.
Charles, 105 S.Ct. 2356 (1985), on appealfrom Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984).
Among its other arguments, the administration contends that Roe cannot be defended as a
decision based on developing societal values: "The story traced by the Court does not show a
steady and growing acceptance of a point of view until the practice in a few jurisdictions can be
characterized as anomalous." Id. at 27. See supra note 101 and accompanying text. See generally U.S. BriefAsks Court to Reverse Abortion Ruling: Administration Seeking to Undo 1973
Ruling, N.Y. Times, July 16, 1985, at 8, col. 1.
Despite the administration's position, there is no indication that the Court is prepared to
overrule its decision in Roe. Indeed, during the oral arguments in the pending abortion cases,
the Justices' questions focused largely on procedural issues. See Arguments Before the Court,
54 U.S.L.W. 3356 (1985).
150. "Precedential support," in this context, is not limited to direct holdings by the
Supreme Court, but includes statements of dicta as well as statements embraced by less than a
majority of the Justices. The Court frequently relies on these various sources of authority, and
it is therefore appropriate to identify them as potential building blocks for the recognition of a
new constitutional doctrine.
151. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5.
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Supreme Court has recognized that this section gives Congress some
power to define the scope of the amendment's guarantees of individual
rights. In the leading case of Katzenbach v. Morgan, 52 the Court held
that Congress could act under section 5 to prohibit the enforcement of
state laws that the Court would not necessarily have invalidated directly
under the Equal Protection Clause.' 53 Although Katzenbach involved
congressional legislation that extended the reach of the Fourteenth
Amendment's prohibitions on state action, there also have been suggestions of a congressional power to restrictthe reach of the amendment by
authorizing majoritarian actions that the Court otherwise would find unconstitutional. In Fullilove v. Klutznick, 154 for example, the plurality
opinion relied heavily on Congress' section 5 power'5 5 in upholding a
compensatory racial classification that the Court might well have invalidated had it been adopted by a state acting without congressional approval.156 Most recently, the Court has gone so far as to suggest in dicta
that it devises Fourteenth Amendment standards only in the absence of
"controlling congressional direction."' 5 7
To be sure, the Court sometimes has construed Congress' power
more narrowly, 158 and the controlling doctrine under section 5 therefore
152. 384 U.S. 641 (1966).
153. See id. at 648-50. The Court stated that section 5 "grant[ed] to Congress, by a specific
provision applicable to the Fourteenth Amendment, the same broad powers expressed in the
Necessary and Proper Clause, Art. I, § 8, cl. 18." Id. at 650. See also id. at 668 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) ("In effect the Court reads § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment as giving Congress
the power to define the substantive scope of the Amendment.") (emphasis in original).
154. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
155. See id. at 476-78.
156. In Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978), only four Justices
indicated a general willingness to uphold state-adopted compensatory racial classifications.
See id. at 324-79 (Brennan, White, Marshall, and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment in
part and dissenting in part). By the time Fullilove was decided two years later, the number
apparently had been reduced to three. See Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 517-22 (1980)
(Marshall, J., joined by Brennan and Blackmun, JJ., concurring in the judgment).
157. See City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 105 S. Ct. 3249, 3254 (1985) ("Section 5 of the Amendment empowers Congress to enforce [the Equal Protection Clause], but
absent controlling congressional direction, the courts have themselves devised standards for
determining the validity of state legislation or other official action that is challenged as denying
equal protection.").
158. In Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112 (1970), for example, although the Court upheld a
number of provisions in the Voting Rights Act Amendments of 1970, it refused to recognize a
congressional power under section 5 to extend the franchise to eighteen-year-olds in state and
local elections. See id. at 117-18 (Black, J., announcing the judgment of the Court). Indeed, in
Katzenbach itself, the Court had stated that "Congress' power under section 5 is limited to
adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; section 5 grants Congress no
power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641,
651 n.10 (1966). In Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982), the Court
relied upon this language from Katzenbach in rejecting an argument that Mississippi's opera-
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is very much in doubt.15 9 Nonetheless, there is precedential support for
some congressional role in determining the extent to which individual
rights should be constitutionally protected under the Fourteenth Amendment.16 0 This amendment- either standing alone or as a vehicle for "incorporating" Bill of Rights norms for application to state, as opposed to
federal, governmental action-provides the textual basis for a substantial
majority of the Supreme Court's decisions protecting individual rights.
In all such cases, the Court could utilize a jurisprudence derived from
section 5 in adopting my suggested model of provisional review. Even in
those few cases in which a provisional ruling might be appropriate
outside the realm of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court would not be
entirely without precedential support in adopting a provisional method
of decision. 6 Indeed, the Fourteenth Amendment has such an overtion of a women-only nursing school might have been authorized by congressional legislation.
See id. at 732-33 ("Although we give deference to congressional decisions and classifications,
neither Congress nor a State can validate a law that denies the rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment.").
159. For a general discussion of Congress' power under section 5 and under comparable
provisions of the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, see Choper, CongressionalPower to
Expand JudicialDefinitions of the Substantive Terms of the Civil War Amendments, 67 MINN.
L. REv. 299 (1982). See generally Estreicher, CongressionalPower and ConstitutionalRights:
Reflections on Proposed "Human Life" Legislation, 68 VA. L. Rnv. 333 (1982).
160. In addition to the Court's interpretations of section 5, there are other cases indicating
that special deference should be given to Congress when the Court considers the constitutionality of federal statutes, even when those statutes, if adopted by a state, might be subject to
invalidation under the Fourteenth Amendment. Relying on Congress' power over immigration
and naturalization, for example, the Court typically upholds federal classifications that disadvantage aliens even though similar state classifications are likely to be invalidated under the
Equal Protection Clause. Compare Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976) with Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971). More generally, the Court has suggested that when it evaluates an Act of Congress that has been challenged on equal protection grounds, it "accords
'great weight to the decisions of Congress,"' especially when Congress has "specifically considered the question of the Act's constitutionality." See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 64
(1981) (quoting Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 102
(1973)).
161. See, e.g., Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88, 105 (1976) (finding a United
States Civil Service Commission regulation that discriminated against resident aliens to be
unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment, but suggesting that the same regulation might
be upheld "if the Congress or the President ... expressly imposed the citizenship requirement"). See also Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 548-54 (1980) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(indicating that he would invalidate the compensatory racial classification under review as a
violation of the Fifth Amendment, but that he would leave open the issue of whether such a
classification could be readopted after appropriately thorough congressional consideration);
Califano v. Goldfarb, 430 U.S. 199, 223 n.9 (1977) (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment)
(suggesting that a "considered legislative choice" by Congress might justify the gender-based
classification that he found to be unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment). Cf Welsh v.
United States, 398 U.S. 333, 371-72 (1970) (White, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Supreme
Court should respect congressional judgments accommodating free exercise and establishment
considerations under the religion clauses of the First Amendment). See generally supra notes
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whelming influence on the Court's constitutional doctrine that decisions
interpreting the amendment, including those interpreting section 5, may
be relevant even when the amendment is not directly applicable.16 2 In

sum, the Court could readily build upon its section1635 jurisprudence in
adopting my proposed model of provisional review.

138-143 and accompanying text (discussing Supreme Court rulings that reflect "structural" or
"procedural" judicial review).
In identifying a source of congressional power to provide national standards governing
issues of individual rights, the Court of course would not be limited to section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. The Court's Commerce Clause decisions, for example, have construed
Congress' power so expansively that the notion that Congress holds only a limited number of
constitutionally enumerated powers has become little more than a fiction. See Hodel v. Virconcurginia Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 307 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
ring in the judgment). See also, eg., Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 105 S.Ct.
1005 (1985) (overruling National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976)), in which the
Supreme Court had recognized a Tenth Amendment limitation on Congress' power to regulate
state and local governmental entities); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964) (upholding Title II of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as within Congress' power under
the Commerce Clause). Congress' spending power might be particularly well suited to the task
of providing national legislative standards to govern questions of individual rights. See Lupu,
supra note 43, at 1049 n.323. Cf Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 473-80 (1980) (plurality
opinion) (discussing the relationship among Congress' commerce power, its spending power,
and its power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment).
162. Cf Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954) (suggesting that "it would be unthinkable" not to apply Fourteenth Amendment equal protection standards under the Fifth Amendment's Due Process Clause); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448, 551-52 (1980) (Stevens, .,
dissenting) ("If the general language of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment authorizes this Court to review Acts of Congress under the standards of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment-a clause that cannot be found in the Fifth Amendment-there can be no separation-of-powers objection to a more tentative holding of unconstitutionality.... ."). See generally J. AGRESTO, supra note 5, at 133 ("Our full understanding of
the extent of congressional power under section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment ...is only
now starting to be worked out.").
163. The enhanced congressional role that I have suggested might draw the Fourteenth
Amendment closer to its historical foundations, for there is evidence that the framers of the
amendment "were primarily interested in augmenting the power of Congress, rather than the
judiciary." Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648 n.7 (1966). Indeed, the framers apparently viewed the judiciary with considerable suspicion:
[T]he Radicals did not trust the judiciary in general and the Supreme Court in particular, either before or after the passage of the resolution submitting the proposed
amendment to the states....
...The Court was denounced as a refuge for treason and a usurper, basing its

opinions on policy and not law, and numerous bills, two of which passed, were introduced to curtail and even abolish the appellate jurisdiction of the Court and to diminish its membership. On one occasion the irrepressible Bingham even suggested
the possibility of reducing the number of justices to three, and appeared generous in
stopping there.
R.

HARRIS, THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY:

THE CONSTITUTION, CONGRESS

AND

THE

SUPREME COURT 53-55 (1960). Cf.J.NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J.YOUNG, supra note 17, at

837-38 ("There was simply no reason for the framers to anticipate a Court which would liberally recognize individual rights more expansively than the Congress.. ."). But cf Burt, Mirandaand Title II: A MorganaticMarriage,1969 SuP. Or.REv. 81, 95 ("[I]n 1865 and 1866,
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In evaluating the modesty of my proposal, it also is important to

bear in mind its limited nature. I am not arguing, as has Dean Terrance
Sandalow, that the Supreme Court's protection of individual rights
should always give way to deliberate and broadly based majoritarian decisions."' Nor am I suggesting, as has Professor Paul R. Dimond, that
Congress should be given a general power to overturn broad classes of
the Court's constitutional decisions.165 Rather, I contend only that the
Supreme Court should use the option of provisional review in selected
there was every reason for the supporters of the Fourteenth Amendment to look confidently
toward the judiciary."). See generally Farber & Muench, supra note 39, at 236 ("The Fourteenth Amendment was intended to bridge the gap between positive law and higher law by
empowering the national government to protect the natural rights of its citizens.").
164. Writing in what might be characterized as a tentative essay, Dean Sandalow has argued that constitutional law must be seen to evolve in response to changing societal values, and
that there is no better available statement than that of Congress concerning the present state of
our evolving social morality. See Sandalow, supra note 117, at 1179-81, 1182. As a result,
Sandalow contends that congressional legislation should be deemed to provide controlling constitutional standards. See id at 1186-87, 1189-90. Somewhat more cautiously, he also suggests that legislation recently enacted by most of the states might properly be treated the same
way. See id. at 1186-87, 1194. In order to attain this authoritative constitutional status, however, the legislative decisions of Congress or of the states would have to reflect "deliberate and
broadly based" political judgments. See id. at 1188. Thus, Sandalow's argument "calls for
judicial submission only to decisions that have been deliberately made by Congress and, perhaps also, to decisions expressed in legislation adopted by most states." Id. at 1190.
The basic thrust of Sandalow's argument is sound and, indeed, is consistent with much of
what I say here. But Sandalow paints with too broad a brush in contending that the Supreme
Court always should yield to majoritarian decisions of the type he describes. Such an argument ignores the role of emerging (but not yet generally accepted) societal values as a source of
constitutional norms and ignores the possibility that judicial review, in certain applications,
may perform functions that are not well served by deference to a national legislative consensus.
See infra notes 168 & 171-172 and accompanying text. Although Sandalow does not fully
delineate the ramifications of his theory for the doctrine of judicial finality, the theory would
appear to suggest that every Supreme Court decision protecting individual rights should be
subject to reversal by deliberate congressional legislation (and perhaps by deliberate legislation
adopted by a majority of the states). Such a position goes far beyond what I advocate in this
Article.
165. In a recent article that he labels "exploratory," Professor Dimond has set forth a
model of judicial review under which Supreme Court decisions would bind the states but
"would not bind Congress except when based on the largely process-oriented and representation reinforcing limits imposed directly on Congress by the Constitution." See Dimond, supra
note 111, at 202. These "direct" constitutional restraints would consist primarily of the limits
stated in section 9 of Article I and in the first eight amendments to the Constitution, with the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment being "understood solely as a procedural limit."
See id. at 202 n.3, 223, 230. Expressing a sentiment similar to Sandalow's call for "deliberate"
legislative decisionmaking, see supra note 164, Dimond would insist that "any congressional
action modifying or reversing Court decisions... address[ ] the merits." See Dimond, supra
note 11, at 202, 230-31. Focusing especially on the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, which limits state but not congressional power, Dimond argues that
his model is authorized, although not compelled, by the text and structure of the Constitution.
See id. at 218. See also id. at 209-29. He also discusses the impact of his model on congres-
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individual rights cases. I thus would leave to the Court, not to Congress,
the determination of which constitutional rulings would be subject to
congressional modification. In an appropriate case, the Court would announce the provisional nature of its ruling; absent such announcement,
the Court's constitutional decisions would have their traditional, "final"
effect. Under this model, the Court would remain the "ultimate interpreter of the Constitution"1 6 6 -indeed, a more powerful and effective interpeter, given the addition of a new and important jurisprudential tool
that would supplement, not replace, the Court's traditional practice of
final judicial review.
Perhaps the Court should use provisional review in a large number
of its decisions protecting individual rights. If the role of the Court is to
promote national standards that reflect American societal values, one
could argue Congress always is a superior institution for making the ultimate decision on what those standards should be. 1 67 But the progressive
function of nonoriginalist review does not permit provisional rulings in
every case. When the evolving pattern of American moral development
is clear, the Court properly may recognize constitutional rights on the
basis of emerging national values that have not yet gained societal acceptance, and that therefore might not hold sway in congressional deliberations.168 Moreover, congressional legislation does not always reflect even
the nation's contemporary values concerning issues of individual
rights. 1 69 As a result, the Supreme Court should not always use provisional review. Further, the Court must retain the authority to invalidate,
on appropriate grounds, any congressional legislation that is adopted in
response to an initial, provisional ruling by the Court.170
sional enforcement acts under the post-Civil War amendments and on constitutional doctrine
protecting substantive rights and "anti-caste" principles. See id. at 232-38.
Like Sandalow, Dimond offers many important insights that complement what I say in
this Article. Of special note is his attempt to demonstrate that a provisional mode ofjudicial
decisionmaking need not disserve the "representation-reinforcing" function of judicial review
posited by Dean John Hart Ely, see supra note 110 and accompanying text. See generally infra
text accompanying notes 171-172. Nonetheless, also like Sandalow and for similar reasons,
Dimond is wrong to define the congressional role in constitutional interpretation as broadly as
he does. See supra note 164. It therefore is not surprising that Dimond himself is reluctant to
embrace the model that he has drawn. See Dimond, supra note 111, at 203, 239-40.
166. Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 549 (1969); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211
(1962).
167. Cf C. BLACK, supra note 46, at 41 ("As to issues of nationalconsensus, the presumption has to be that Congress is the empowered voice.") (emphasis in original).
168. The most important example of such a case is Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483
(1954). See supra text accompanying note 91. See also Conkle, supra note 6, at 635.
169. See supra notes 117-124 and accompanying text.
170. The Court's review of such congressional legislation ordinarily would not include a
substantive reconsideration of the very issue that the Court had invited Congress to address.
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Despite these caveats, provisional review would seem well suited to
the Court's progressive and nationalizing functions in a large number of
the cases in which the Court is asked to invalidate state or local governmental actions. I remain reluctant, however, to advocate a widespread
use of my model. Nonoriginalist review may serve functions beyond
those that I have indentified, 7 1 and such functions might be frustrated
by anything less than final judicial review." 2 An overuse of provisional
review, moreover, might reduce the force of all of the Supreme Court's
constitutional opinions. While provisional rulings of the sort I have proposed would require the Court to concede the nonoriginalist nature of its
decisionmaking process, that in itself should not be reason for concern.173
For the Court to recognize a broad new role for Congress, however,
might work to undercut the Court's preeminent, if plainly nonoriginalist,
role in identifying and articulating our nation's constitutional values.1 74
But it would permit the Court to ensure that Congress gave adequate consideration to the
issue, which is itself a form of provisional review. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying
text. The Court likewise could resolve any separate constitutional question that might be
presented by the legislation.
171. See supra note 110 and accompanying text.
172. Perhaps the basic functions of nonoriginalist review vary in different types of individual rights cases. If so, the selective use of provisional review would nonetheless be appropriate
when the progressive and nationalizing functions of nonoriginalist review form the primary
basis for the Supreme Court's constitutional decisionmaking. These functions seem clearly to
predominate, for example, in the Court's substantive due process, equal protection, and Eighth
Amendment cases. It may be that other functions, however, have special importance in other
areas. Cf. Blasi, The PathologicalPerspective and the FirstAmendment, 85 COLUM. L. REV.
449, 450 (1985) ("[Ihe speech, press, and assembly clauses of the First Amendment, as well as
some other provisions of the Constitution-the religion clauses and the dormant Commerce
Clause come to mind-are best viewed as having primarily a preservative function.").
173. Although the Supreme Court generally has been reluctant to admit the nonoriginalist
nature of its decisionmaking, it has done so-in one way or another-in a number of constitutional cases. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 639-48. Judicial candor, moreover, is a necessary
condition for the legitimate exercise of judicial review, see id. at 657-58, 663, and a fear of
candor therefore cannot be pressed as a valid reason for rejecting the option of provisional
rulings.
174. Professor Robert A. Burt has argued that any suggestion by the Supreme Court
that Congress has, to whatever degree, an "independent" role in interpreting the
Constitution. . . is likely to remove an important restraint on Congress which has,
in the past, usually counseled great wariness in trespassing on the Court's prerogatives ....
[The Supreme Court] will have surrendered, in part at least, one of the
Court's most potent institutional weapons: the authoritative tone of its constitutional
ipse dixit.
Burt, supra note 163, at 133-34. But cf id. at 134 (noting that "these dangers may be overstated"); Dimond, supra note 111, at 237 ("ITihe mantle of binding finality . . . might be
replaced by honest recognition that the Court can act as a forum of principle, searching for
right answers or the best instincts of the evolving national conscience."). See generally Conkle, supra note 6, at 660-61 (noting the risks of a broad congressional role in considering
jurisdiction-limiting legislation based on the merits of particular Supreme Court decisions).
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Accordingly, my proposal, like any change in a basic governmental practice, should be implemented with caution.
At least initially, I would urge the Supreme Court to use provisional
review only when the need for a national answer is great 1 75 and when the
pattern of American moral development does not itself provide sufficient
guidance for the Court to recognize a "final" constitutional right.'76 I
admit that these criteria are imprecise. I contend, for example, that the
relevant pattern of American moral development was sufficiently clear at
the time of Brown v. Board of Education177 that the case properly was
decided as a final judicial decision, 17 but that the relevant pattern at the
time of Roe v. Wade' 79 was substantially less clear, to the point that the
Court would better have acted provisionally.' 8 Some would disagree
with that assessment. But the fact that standards may be imprecise and

subject to differing interpretations is not necessarily a reason for rejecting
them. All constitutional standards call for the exercise of judgment8
these no more so than others.' '
I have identified three fundamental issues-abortion, homosexual
rights, and compensatory racial discrimination-that would be likely
subjects for provisional review."'1 83 Each of these issues is currently pending before the Supreme Court.
There may be other issues that also
175. Or when, on a fundamental issue of the type requiring a national resolution, there is
an existing national "answer" that is either obsolete or the product of inadequate congressional
consideration. See supra notes 116-124 and accompanying text.
176. Thus, in the exercise of provisional review, as in the exercise of final review, the Court
must be satisfied that the functional utility of judicial intervention is sufficient to overcome the
general presumption of deference to the majoritarian decision under attack. See generally
Conkle, supra note 6, at 663-64 (discussing the importance of judicial restraint).
177. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
178. See supra text accompanying note 91. See also Conkle, supra note 6, at 635.
179. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
180. See supra notes 98-103 & 113-114 and accompanying text. This distinction between
Brown and Roe rests in part on the rather obvious moral appeal of the principle that the Court
was asked to endorse in Brown, at least when compared to the moral complexities of the competing considerations that confronted the Court in Roe. Cf A. BICKEL, supra note 46, at 239
("[Tihe Court should declare as law only such principles as will-in time, but in a rather
immediate foreseeable future-gain general assent.").
181. Are my criteria less precise than the various standards of constitutional decisionmaking advocated by other legal scholars? See generally Wiseman, The New Supreme Court Commentators: The Principled,the Political,and the Philosophical, 10 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 315
(1983). Are they less precise than the standards that actually guided the Court's decision in
Roe, whatever those (unarticulated) standards might have been?
182. See supra notes 98-110, 113-115, & 126 and accompanying text.
183. In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 105 S. Ct. 2015
(1985), on appealfrom 737 F.2d 283 (3rd Cir. 1984), and Diamond v. Charles, 105 S. Ct. 2356
(1985), on appealfrom Charles v. Daley, 749 F.2d 452 (7th Cir. 1984), the Supreme Court has
been asked by the Reagan administration to overrule the Court's landmark abortion decision
in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See supra note 149. Rather than take that step, the
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review.
would justify an invocation of provisional
85
need only await the passage of time.'

84
'

If not, however, we

Conclusion
In this Article, I have proposed a model of provisional judicial review that would serve to supplement the traditional model of final review."8 6 Although I call only for a modest revision in the Supreme
Court's institutional practice, it would be an important revision nonetheless, one that would facilitate the Court's performance of what may be

the two most critical functions of nonoriginalist judicial review-furthering American moral progress and providing national resolutions for
highly controversial issues of individual rights. Unlike the Court's ex1 87
isting practice, which does permit some "non-final" judicial decisions,
my proposal would allow the Court to focus directly and candidly on the
factors that ought to guide its decisionmaking. My model also would
reduce the tension between nonoriginalist judicial review and the principle of majoritarian consent by permitting an enhanced congressional role
Court might better consider the possibility of modifying Roe so as to make it provisional in
nature, and thereby subject to congressional reconsideration.
In the area of homosexual rights, the Court has before it the issue of whether constitutional protection should be extended to consensual homosexual relations, notwithstanding the
Court's earlier refusal to extend such protection in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425
U.S. 901 (1976), affig 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975). See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct.
342 (1985), grantingcert to 760 F.2d 1202 (1lth Cir. 1985). See also supra notes 104 & 107. If
my argument has merit, the Court should at least grant provisional constitutional protection to
the rights that are being asserted.
The Court also has the opportunity to adopt a provisional ruling disfavoring compensatory racial discrimination in the absence of congressional action. See Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of
Educ., 105 S. Ct. 2015 (1985), grantingcerL to 746 F.2d 1152 (6th Cir. 1984). See also Local
28 v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 106 S. Ct. 58 (1985), granting cerL to Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Local 638, 753 F.2d 1172 (2d Cir. 1985); Local No. 93,
International Assoc. of Firefighters v. City of Cleveland, 106 S. Ct. 59 (1985), grantingcert. to
Vanguards of Cleveland v. City of Cleveland, 753 F.2d 479 (6th Cir. 1985). See generally
supra note 108. The Court's existing doctrine on this type of discrimination is unsettled. To
the extent that precedent does exist, it would not preclude-and indeed might support-a
provisional ruling of the type I have proposed. See supra notes 154-156 and accompanying
text. See also supra text accompanying notes 119-124.
184. The death penalty would seem a likely candidate, or at least it might have been in
1972 when the Court decided Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). See generally supra
notes 140-142 and accompanying text.
185. Cf Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910) ("Time works changes, brings
into existence new conditions and purposes.... In the application of a constitution, therefore,
our contemplation cannot be only of what has been but of what may be.").
186. Needless to say, this Article does not presume to resolve every question that my proposal might raise. I have not addressed, for example, the possible use of provisional review by
the lower federal courts or by state courts considering federal constitutional questions.
187. See supra notes 138-143 and accompanying text.
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in determining the content of constitutional rights.I s
Although my proposal for reshaping judicial review forms an essential part of this Article,18 9 there is more to my effort. I have explained
how the doctrine of judicial finality presents serious theoretical problems
in the context of nonoriginalist review, and I have addressed those
problems in discussing the functions and functional operation of this review. Perhaps most significant, I have highlighted the nationalizing
function of nonoriginalist review, a function that can only increase in
importance as we draw ever closer together as a society-as an American
society.
What John Donne wrote of the European community in the 1620's
might suggest a vision of the United States for the 1980's and beyond, a
vision in which we increasingly regard each of our fellow citizens,19
from whatever state or region, as part of the American polity and as
persons therefore equally entitled to the fundamental rights that we value
as a nation:
No Man is an fland, intire of it selfe; every man is a peece of the
Continent, a part of the maine; if a Clod bee washed away by the
Sea, Europe is the lesse, as well as if a Promontoriewere, as well as
if a Mannor of thyfriends or of Thine owne were; Any Mans death
diminishes me, because I am involved in Mankinde; And therefore
never send to know for whom the bell tolls; It tolls for thee.1 9 '

188. The primary justification for provisional review, however, lies not in its facilitation of
majoritarian rule, but rather in its utility in furthering the proper identification of nonoriginalist constitutional rights. A complete reconciliation of nonoriginalist review with the principle
of majoritarian rule-if any such reconciliation is possible-depends on evidence that Congress has consented to the Supreme Court's nonoriginalist role by declining to restrict the
Court's appellate jurisdiction. See Conkle, supra note 6, at 638-58.
189. Needless to say, a failure by the Supreme Court to adopt my proposed model would in
no way affect its theoretical integrity.
190. For an essay suggesting that even a limitation of "fellow citizens" may be problematic,
see Walzer, The Distribution of Membership, in BOUNDARIES: NATIONAL AUTONOMY AND

ITS LIMITS 1 (1981).
191. J. DONNE, Devotions, XVII.

